I. Jagdkorps (I. JK)[Notes 1] (1st Fighter Corps) was formed 15 September 1943 in Zeist from the XII.

This was attempted by studying the weather forecasts, listening in on enemy radio transmissions and monitoring the radar services.

It received the divisions readiness reports and dictated broad lines of strategic fighter employment.

In frustration, its commanding officer Joseph Schmid, wrote to the Reichsluftfahrtministerium (RLM – Reich Air Ministry) to increase his own powerbase and role of I.JK in the defence of Germany.

Schmid also added that a central commanding unit should be set up to direct day and night fighter defences.

Although the Germans failed to intercept them on the way to the target, the staff of I. JK guessed correctly the return route of the bomber stream.

Every day and night fighter made contact and, aided by perfect weather, shot down 28 bombers and damaged two so badly they were scrapped.

Schmid stated that Wilde Sau units had suffered high losses which damaged combat effectiveness of the day fighter force.

[6] On 23 February 1944 Schmid reorganized his forces in I. JK to contain: During Big Week – part of the Allied strategy to force the Luftwaffe to commit aircraft it could not afford to lose – on 24 February 1944, I. JK and II.

[7] On 25 February 1944, I. JK was duped by a diversionary raid into withholding Jagdgeschwader 11 on standby in order to counter a suspected target in eastern Germany.

Before the mistake was realised, the B-24s of the USAAF turned back and it was too late to get JG 11 involved in the fighting.

[8] At the end of February 1944, Schimd stated in I Jagdkorps War Diary that the raids of Big Week had disrupted the flow of aircraft plants to the extent that supply to their defences were impossible.

[9] Schmid stated that the multiple raids on the same day effectively dissipated the air defences.

Schmid complained decentralized command was impossible, as units were subject to different division, air fleet or Korps headquarters.

Hermann Göring gave I. JK the responsibility of defending the coastal, Berlin and central areas of Germany.

[10] Along with other Korps and Flieger and Jagddisivions, the USAAF Eighth Air Force lost 69 bombers and a further six damaged – its highest of the war.

Schmid moved his Headquarters from Zeist, Netherlands to Brunswick,[12] reflecting I. JK abandonment of forward defence.

[12] The 3rd Bomb Division of the USAAF Eighth Air Force was intercepted by elements of I. JK which committed Fliegerdivisions 1, 2 and 3 on its way to Brunswick and Munster.

Strong head winds meant it flew ahead of schedule and missed its escort.

Schmid calculated that I Jagdkorps flew 2,226 sorties in March 1944 and lost 240 aircraft, or 10.9 percent.

[14] On 2 April the Fifteenth Air Force flew missions against Steyr, Austria which housed aircraft assembly plants and ball-bearings factories.

On 8 April 1944 the Eighth Air Force attacked aviation industry targets around Brunswick.

On one pass, the German fighters mistakenly turned into the side of the Mustangs, climbing, after making an attack.

I. JK war diary indicated most of the 72 fighters claimed lost in were a result of strafing attacks.