The pilots were distracted by conversations unrelated to the flight and were not aware of the condition of the aircraft until it was already too late.

[1] To transport its employees and their families between facilities, Sirte Oil Company operates a number of aircraft.

Other nationalities on board included 14 Libyans, three Indians, two Canadians, two Croatians, three Filipinos, and one person each from Tunisia and Pakistan.

[2] The captain was 42-year-old Abdul-Hafeez al-Abbar, a Libyan national with a total flying experience of 8,814 hours, 3,840 of which were on the Shorts 360.

The first officer was a 49-year-old Libyan national, identified only as Bashir, with a total flying experience of 10,422 hours, 1,950 of which were on the type.

[3] The aircraft involved in the crash was a Shorts 360, a commuter turbo-prop airliner that was manufactured in Belfast, United Kingdom.

The Captain then ordered the first officer to raise the landing gear and flaps, then asked him to confirm if they just had an engine failure.

Swiss Transportation Ministry spokesman Hugo Schiltenhelm received reports that 15 people had died in the crash.

The AAIB had offered their facility of Farnborough in Hampshire to analyse the content of the black boxes.

There was no unusual sound from either engine and so metal or mechanical failure were ruled out from the possible causes of the crash.

Crew mismanagement and fuel supply cut off were also considered as unlikely due to lack of evidence.

Post-crash interview with the captain revealed that he thought that Tripoli Airport had not provided the weather briefing on the route.

The provided weather report indicated that the aircraft would likely fly into significant cloud formation along the route to Marsa Brega.

However, rather than paying attention to the abnormal condition on both engines the crew were still busy engaging in conversation on the system of Fokker F28.

[1]: 7–12 In accordance with the written procedure, the flight crew should have attempted to relight the malfunctioning left engine.

[1]: 7–12 The Tunisian cabin crew did not inform the passengers that the seat cushions of the aircraft could be used as a floatation device, an alternative to life jackets.

The presence of floatation device could benefit passengers in case search and rescue team did not manage to find survivors in a timely manner.

[1]: 7–12 Avisto and representatives from Switzerland stated that floatation device are not required for flights flying at less than 50 miles (43 nmi; 80 km) or more from land, explaining why the aircraft was not equipped with life vests.

The crew failed to monitor the condition of their aircraft as they were being engaged in conversations unrelated to the flight.