2003 Melbourne runaway train

An investigation identified driver error as the cause of the accident, but the runaway event prompted significant debate about the role of government authorities and private operators in ensuring safety and reliability on the Melbourne rail network.

[7] The driver ran out onto the platform where another passenger told him it’s in the direction of the city, the driver jumped onto the track and began to chase the train down the line on foot but, as the train had now been rolling for some 3 minutes, he was unable to catch it, and rang the Broadmeadows signaller from a phone box on a signal post raising the alarm.

The first was to Electrol, the electricity control centre for the suburban railway network, asking officers to turn off power to the overhead lines in the hope that this might help slow the train but this did not work.

[10] The later report into the accident found that the contents of the call suggested neither Metrol nor the Spencer Street staff understood the gravity of the situation at this point in time.

The driver of 5262 was informed of the emergency and told to run through North Melbourne station as quickly as possible when the signal cleared.

Briefly, however, it appeared that the diversion had been unsuccessful and a major collision had occurred: the signallers' indications showed the two trains on the same path, and controllers could not raise the driver of 5262 on the radio.

Eventually, the driver contacted Metrol and told the controllers the runaway had sped past him and continued into North Melbourne station.

The East Suburban line led to a number of routes which presented the risk of catastrophic outcomes: the empty dead-end platform 8, which had only short stop blocks that could have allowed the body of the derailed train to "spear" over the top and into the passenger area of the station; sidings beyond platform 8 which were too complicated to access in the short time-frame available; and through tracks 10, 10A and 11, which would have directed the runaway into the extremely busy area around Flinders Street station, the main suburban terminus.

Dead-end platform 7 was also accessible from the East Suburban line, and was occupied only by empty carriages stabled overnight for a service the following morning, but Metrol officers did not come to know this in the short decision-making time available.

[17] About 45 seconds prior to the impact, Metrol desperately attempted to contact platform staff at the station to warn them of the impending collision.

[20][21] Victoria Police Air Wing helicopters equipped with infrared cameras were deployed throughout the night along the Broadmeadows line to search for bodies of potential victims struck by the train, but none were found.

Meanwhile, media speculation focused on the inability of controllers to stop the train, and the possibility that a brake fault reported on 31 January had contributed to the accident.

[23] However, the police investigation quickly ruled out criminal involvement in the accident, and the Rail Safety Regulator, an independent government body, issued immediate instructions to drivers to ensure trains were properly secured with the park brake when left unattended or during a change of ends.

[26] Then, in mid-November, when a shunting accident at Spencer Street injured 13 people in circumstances compared by passengers and media organisations to the runaway, concerns were repeated that no findings had been made.

[27] The ATSB report was released in December 2003, with the driver's failure to apply the park brake identified as the major cause of the accident.

Transport Minister Peter Batchelor praised the signal and control staff who had managed to avert a collision with 5262 at North Melbourne, and said that disciplinary action against the driver of 5264 would be considered.

Public transport advocates and Rail, Tram and Bus Union representatives argued that the accident could have been dealt with more swiftly had Metrol been able to access more information on the train's position.

[33] Ten years later, with the ageing train control systems at Metrol still overdue for replacement, the accident was again cited as an example of the significant limitations of the existing arrangement.