[29] Local analysts estimated that with rising living costs, almost 100 per cent of the average Bulgarian household's monthly income would be spent on utilities, food, transportation, healthcare and education.

[44] A major blow to GERB's popularity came after their decision to cancel the Belene Nuclear Power Plant project, which was believed to be a way to reduce electricity costs and create jobs.

[49][50] On 10 February, demonstrations occurred in Sofia, Plovdiv, Varna, Burgas, Ruse, Veliko Tarnovo, Shumen, Blagoevgrad, Sandanski, Silistra, Yambol, Gotse Delchev, Belene, Montana, Pazardjik, Dobrich and Kardzhali.

[11] On 17 February, a fictitious declaration supposedly written by the three foreign power companies and dismissing the protester demands while calling on them to accept their own responsibility for the situation that had transpired, was circulated in the social media and caused further anger against the energy providers.

[11] Key motorways and transport routes in the country were blocked; rocks, bottles and eggs were thrown against Gendarmerie units, the Ministry of Economy and the National Assembly in the capital.

[65] The crowds were pushed back to Eagles' Bridge (the starting point of the protest), and after their demands to begin immediate talks with government representatives remained unanswered, they moved towards the National Palace of Culture.

[80] According to analysis conducted by the information agency BGNES, Borisov is the first Bulgarian prime minister (since Zhan Videnov in 1997) to step down due to hunger fuelled discontent and protests related to the general state of the economy.

Evgeniy Daynov was critical, maintaining that the timing and the way in which Borisov went about his decision were ill-chosen, creating the impression of a weak and indecisive leader in addition to allowing him to refrain from addressing potentially valid demands.

[83] Others such as Kantcho Stoychev characterized it as the only correct and wise move given the difficult circumstances and were optimistic regarding Borisov's chances to retain his influence in politics and continue to work for the betterment of the country.

[87] Klisarov has ascribed more cynical motives to Borisov's quick resignation, viewing it largely as a matter of preserving GERB's power base and the particized status quo.

Gatherings of citizen committees were scheduled to move to Plovdiv in response to Interior Minister in resignation Tsvetan Tsvetanov's accusations that protest leaders belong to organised crime and drug smuggling circles.

[102] In late February 2013, doctors and medical personnel also voiced dissatisfaction, demanding an urgent meeting with Rosen Plevneliev, due to the limits on their freedom to practice their occupation and see patients that had been imposed by the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF).

Accordingly, a higher proportion of respondents - 67% - credited the protests for bringing about economic changes (like the reduction in electricity prices), with the number of those well-disposed towards the political transformations as a result of the demonstrations (such as the preliminary elections) a lower one - 47%.

[139] Plevneliev and the main political parties have been blamed by some sources for allegedly only feigning interest in the protesters' concerns and not acting to change the electoral rules prior to the Parliament's dissolution.

Due to GERB's political isolation and what Borisov characterized as "his unwillingness to take part in unprincipled coalitions", the party did not attempt to form a government by subjecting its chosen cabinet to a vote in the National Assembly and the president passed on the baton to BSP.

[144] Leading figures of the party Bulgaria Without Censorship (Bulgarian: "България без цензура"), which was officially established on 25 January 2014,[145] have made statements suggesting that the majority of the February protesters eventually flocked to them.

[152] In early March 2013, mayor Rositsa Yanakieva revealed that 288 separate lawsuits against ČEZ (pertaining to disputes surrounding the ownership of power substations) had been filed by the Pernik municipality.

[156][157][158][159] On 14 November 2013, the Commission for Energy and Water Regulation (Bulgarian: Комисия за енергийно и водно регулиране) discontinued the procedure of revoking the license of ČEZ Electro Bulgaria.

[162] The demonstrations have been characterized as an authentic expression of the desperation of the less affluent Bulgarians, to a large extent motivated by feelings of absolute and relative deprivation[163][164] and as being dominated by socially oriented demands, associated with the traditional left.

[165] While some analysts have labeled them a "revolt of the poor", others have regarded the people from the middle class social stratum (specifically the now defunct citizen movement "Power" (Bulgarian: гражданско движение СИЛА), members of which had organized demonstrations in Sandanski and Blagoevgrad,[166] as the driving force behind the early unrest.

[170] According to the French ambassador to Bulgaria, Philippe Autié, the protests stemmed from a lack of sufficient trust in the political class and Bulgarian elites as in general as well as the ability of "private and non-transparent stakeholders" to frequently hijack and negatively affect the post-1989 transition processes.

[173] Parvan Simeonov sees the fall-out from the February protests as in indication that the second Bulgarian party system after 1989 (the charismatic one that followed the bipolar model of the 1990s), which began with Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha and continued with Borisov, has now come to an end.

[175] Economist Georgi Angelov from the Sofia Open Society Institute, commenting on the situation one day prior to Borisov's resignation, explained that the country's stability on the global financial markets and bankruptcy indicators have not been seriously affected due to the protests.

[176] In addition to the lack of unity issues among the protest leaders (believed to have played a part in discrediting them with citizens),[177][178] in part exemplified by the split between the "green" and the "other" protesters,[170] as well as their limited familiarity with politics,[179] some commentators have criticized the supposed prominence in the media of leftist spokespeople for the demonstrators[180] and the demand for the creation of a system without political parties, viewing it as unrealistic and non-constructive as well as likely to encourage the promotion of non-democratic ideas,[181][182] akin to the councils that had been implemented in the Soviet Union.

[183] According to Daniel Smilov and Toni Nikolov, in the aftermath of Borisov's resignation, a political power vacuum and an escalation of anti-party sentiments persisted for a short while, with party leaders largely removing themselves from the public sphere.

[185] Former Bulgarian Prime Minister Ivan Kostov insists that both the February demonstrations and the subsequent anti-Oresharski ones remained relatively ineffective due to the lacking political leadership in their ranks.

[187] Antoniy Galabov maintains that while the initial demonstrations were against high utility bills, with the implicit hope that Borisov could rectify the situation, the protests were subsequently taken over by new participants with a different profile, often driven by corporate interests.

[188][189] The demonstrators' demands are believed to have become overly abstract, with the finger being pointed at the whole political system and the nature of the democratic transition;[190] this is thought to have essentially forced all the mainstream parties to incorporate populism into their platforms in order to portray themselves as allies of the people on the streets.

[204] Such pundits tend to characterize the February demonstrations as a coup attempt with the alleged heavy involvement of pro-communist activists,[205][206] because of the Russophilic sentiments of some of the informal leaders of the protests.

[207] In subsequent interviews, some of the leading figures behind the February demonstrations such as Yanko Petrov, Doncho Dudev and Yoanna Ivanova countered the allegations of a major shift in the direction of the protest in an anti-Borisov fashion by claiming that the largest protest аctivities actually occurred in the aftermath of Borisov's resignation (with the anti-monopoly sentiments remaining key) and emphasizing that the three of them were also active in demonstrating against Delyan Peevski's short-lived DANS appointment by the Oresharski government.