2017 Hamas charter

[18][19] According to some analysts Hamas did not formally revoke the old charter so as to not alienate some of its base members, who it feared might join rival Islamist factions.

[16] In his presentation, Mashal described the Hamas movement as following a middle way between two poles: extremism (tatarruf or tashaddud) and flexibility (muyu'a, literally: "liquidity").

[20] In comparison to the Hamas Charter of 1988, which was marked by religious rhetoric and utopian ideas, the newer document was characterized by simple and mostly pragmatic political language.

[8] The document affirmed the movement's adherence to its founding principles, but also left open gray areas to allow Hamas political room for maneuver in the future.

[8] In a departure from the tone of the original charter, which presented the fight against Israel as a religious struggle, the new document said that there was a nationalist conflict "with the Zionist project not with the Jews because of their religion".

"[17] Some analysts opined that Hamas did not revoke the old charter so as to not alienate some of its base members, who it feared might join rival Islamist factions.

[26] Hamas also declared its willingness to support any peace agreement accepted in a popular referendum and distanced itself from all foreign Islamic organisations, including the Muslim Brotherhood, which, having lost power in Egypt, had come to be classed as a terrorist organization there.

[28] Tareq Baconi (Columbia University, European Council on Foreign Relations) gives two reasons why Hamas didn't explicitly recognize Israel:[35] The charter criticizes the agreements reached in the Oslo Accords and rejects them as incompatible with international law.

[8] It describes the state of Israel, created with the help of Western nations, as "entirely illegal" (bâtil in Arabic, meaning an invalid act or contract according to the sharia).

[9] Israeli military analyst Shaul Bartal interpreted this section to mean that the two-state solution was envisaged as a temporary stage and the long-term goal remained the liberation of the whole of Palestine.

Mohammed Ayoob, Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Michigan State University, and Danielle Nicole Lussier saw the policy paper as a sign of "pragmatism", as it left open the possibility of a two-state solution and expressed willingness to co-operate with the Palestinian Authority.

"[1] Nina Musgrave, a scholar at the King's College, London, characterised the document as an "updated communication of the group’s strategy" and noted that it repeated some of its longstanding principles but also showed a "more balanced approach" to Israel.

[41] Azzam Tamimi, a British-Palestinian political scientist close to the Hamas movement[42] said that the new document would "practically" replace the founding charter of 1988.

[46] That represented an obvious logical contradiction, but an Israeli government genuinely interested in a political settlement would have used the new charter and other signs of moderation on the part of Hamas as a basis for further talks, which did not happen.

[47] Matthew Levitt and Maxine Rich, researchers at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, saw the document as an attempt by Hamas to present itself in a more moderate light in order to gain greater international support, given its now more tenuous relations with Iran, the Egyptian government's fight against the Muslim Brotherhood and the bleak economic situation in the Gaza Strip, recently exacerbated by an energy crisis.

[36] David Keyes, spokesman for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from 2016 to 2018, described the policy paper as an attempt by Hamas "to fool the world.

[51] The Israeli Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre assessed that the 2017 Hamas document presented "no change in Hamas's basic ideology and principles, which are based on an uncompromising effort to destroy Israel through violence and terrorism, even if this is carried out in stages (presenting conditional willingness to establish a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders).

[52] Daniel Byman (Georgetown University) and Mackenzie Holtz, in an analysis for the Center for Strategic and International Studies on December 6, 2023, said the negative reactions to the new charter could partly explain Hamas' terrorist attack on Israel on October 7: Netanyahu binned the document, wanted to cut funding for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine, and gave a platform to far-right ideologues such as Bezalel Smotrich.

[53] To support this view, Byman and Holtz cited an interview statement by Hamas official Basem Naim: "We knew there was going to be a violent reaction.

[35] According to extremism researcher Armin Pfahl-Traughber, who pointed out the continuities in the 2017 document compared to the earlier one, the "formal moderation" of the new charter had "a clear objective", namely "strategic deception".

Green noted that while Hamas said in its 2017 charter that it "rejects the persecution of any human being or the undermining of his or her rights on nationalist, religious or sectarian grounds," its 7 October 2023 attack on Israel killed around 1,200 people.

Hamas leader Khaled Mashal presented the new document at a press conference in Doha on 1 May 2017
The Charter was notable for accepting a Palestinian state with the 1967 borders . [ 30 ]