Reports from Human Rights Watch and the US State Department depict the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) as extremely illiberal and unforgiving of political dissent of any kind.

In the book, he also showed how government officials were in reality often sympathetic to workers’ demands, accommodating to concerns with land confiscation, and even to some extent tolerating calls for democratization that threatened the ideology of the regime.

Among the Vietnamese populace, anti-China sentiments act as a converging space for their dissatisfaction with a variety of social issues in the country such as unfavorable labour conditions, environmental pollution, socio-economic development, and foreign policy.

[23] Post–Cold War, and especially since 2010, the sharpest crises and ensuing anti-China protests in Vietnam have involved public outrage over territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

[27] Protesters set fire to industrial parks and factories, hunted down and sparred with Chinese workers, and attacked police during the confrontations, leaving at least 21 people dead and nearly 100 injured.

[33][34] The government further took steps to mollify public anger and show support for the protesters by echoing their sentiments in harsh rhetoric and strongly-worded official statements against China using words such as ‘brazen’ and ‘illegal’.

[36] Given the clear differences in size, capacity, and military power and force, antagonizing China and pushing the issue too far could seriously impact bilateral relations and threaten the existing asymmetrical relationship that has been carefully negotiated throughout the centuries of history.

In 2011, the Hanoi city government issued an order to end the protests that were “undermining national unity” and “complicating diplomatic efforts”, warning demonstrators that authorities would “take necessary measures” against those who disobeyed, and following up on the threat when marches continued.

A study analyzing major diplomatic events from the 1990s to 2018 between the two countries showcase how this official term has been brought up at every single summit meeting since its conception, reminding both sides of their commitment to maintaining bilateral relations.

Protests began in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi but soon spread to towns in six provinces including Danang, Nha Trang, Binh Thuan, and Tai Ninh.

[50] Mainstream and mass media, which are all state institutions by law, provided minimal information or coverage of the 2018 protests, intentionally using vague terms such as “gathering” or “traffic congestion” to downplay any significant social instability.

[51] While the demonstrations were generally peaceful in most cities, there were incidents of violence and destruction in the Binh Thuan province, where protesters stormed government buildings, set vehicles on fire, and grappled with police forces.

[53] Binh Thuan residents were not only venting fury towards China but also towards the local government, whom they perceived as corrupt and enslaved by destructive Chinese commercial interests.

[69] The justification provided by the CPV paints the law as a necessity for the protection of the party and the regime; as General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong proclaimed, “During this time period of 4.0 industrial revolution, there are many benefits but, on the other hand, management is very difficult.

In early 2017, the government banned Vietnamese firms from advertising on YouTube in an effort to pressure Google to remove “toxic content” from its global video-sharing platform.

[77] In December 2017, the Ministry of Defence declared its “cyberwarfare” against the negative impact of the Internet, introducing a unit of 10,000 members entitled “Force 47” that works “every hour, every minute, every second” to fight against “erroneous views” online.

[83] Examples include campaigns from organizations such as the Institute for Studies of Society, Economy and Environment and the Centre for Community Empowerment, which has relied heavily on the social media to reach out to supporters for LGBT rights in Vietnam.

[90] In the 2018 Vietnam protests, the call urging people to rally circulated on social networks such as Facebook and Twitter,[91] and many posters and activists constantly reported real-time and genuine on-the-ground events.

The very fact that the Special Zone Act was postponed under public pressure while the Cybersecurity Law was still adopted despite significant dissent suggests that the CPV regards the medium as a major battleground.

[95] 9-10 June (Saturday and Sunday): The demonstrations began with around 50,000 Vietnamese from a footwear factory taking to the streets of Ho Chi Minh City to protest against the two draft bills.

Riot police used tear gas, smoke bombs, and water cannons to disperse protesters in Binh Thuan province, and arrested over a hundred people.

[98] In the capital Hanoi, police detained more than a dozen protesters who marched down a busy street, some carrying anti-Chinese banners including one that said “No leasing land to China even for one day”.

[104] The police-run Ministry of Public Security continued investigations and released a statement that those who had incited people to vandalize and cause disorder would be dealt with strictly.

In Southern Vietnam however, on the same day, posts on social media and from multiple activists reported that authorities took some 180 people, including active protesters and passive observers, to Tao Dao stadium in Ho Chi Minh City.

18 June (Monday): Vietnamese police arrested eight more people from Binh Thuan, accusing them of disturbing public order, opposing officials and damaging state property.

[109] 12 July: A court in Binh Thuan province jailed six Vietnamese over “disturbing public order” through their participation in the protests, with sentences of two to two and a half years each.

[110] In the same week, then-US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo encouraged a speedy resolution regarding the issue of Will Nguyen during meetings with Vietnamese officials in Hanoi.

State-run newspaper Ho Chi Minh City Law reported that he was not given a prison sentence due to his admittance to his charged offences and sincerity.

[112] 23 July: A court in Binh Thuan province jailed another ten Vietnamese protesters, aged between 18 and 43, over “causing public disorder”, with sentences of two to three and a half years each.

4 September: Huỳnh Trương Ca, a member of the Hiến Pháp group who organised protests in Ho Chi Minh City, is arrested.