Other activities at Fort Sam Houston included the preparation of Standing Operating Procedures; assembly and packing of supplies, equipment, and administrative and professional references; and arranging transportation.

A Far East Joint Medical Regulating Office (FEJMRO) a tri-service organization, maintained the responsibility for designating hospitals in PACOM and CONUS where patients could receive adequate treatment.

From the widely scattered unit base heliports, individual air ambulances were field sited to increase responsiveness to combat forces engaged in operations.

To provide increased availability, non-divisional aviation units, equivalent in size to the air ambulance company, were augmented with an organic direct support level maintenance capability.

Because of the emphasis given to detailed advanced planning and command interest, effective coordination was accomplished and units arriving in-country were fully integrated into the brigade and ongoing operations with minimal delay.

[13] At the beginning of 1968 the S-1 activities of the brigade were limited to officer assignments, awards and decorations, safety program monitoring, and public information liaison with Headquarters, USARV.

This new policy greatly increased the flexibility of both the group and the brigade by allowing for the rapid relocation of Medical Corps officer resources to meet changing tactical situations.

[13] The brigade safety program underwent major revisions beginning on 4 September 1968 when strong command emphasis was given to the expeditious reporting of accidents to ensure that adequate corrective actions were taken to prevent recurrences.

The third phase occurred during the latter part of the year when command and staff attention was directed to realignment and refinement of the field army medical service within the Republic of Vietnam.

In order to provide medical support to the operations of the 9th Infantry Division in IV CTZ, a hospital unit arriving in-country was designated to be stationed in the Delta.

After a brief acclimatization period, each unit assumed the mission of providing complete medical and surgical care for a 250 bed Prisoner of War (POW) hospital.

Additionally, the organic professional capability of the field hospitals permitted these units to expand the POW mission in the areas of surgery, x-ray, pharmacy, and laboratory services.

The primary advantages were the elimination of delays en route to destination hospitals and consolidation of out-of-country evacuations at casualty staging facilities serviced on a regular basis by Military Airlift Command flights.

On numerous occasions this capability was severely strained and frequently on short notice aircraft and crews were moved from one tactical zone to another to support areas of increased activities.

The loss of the 50th Medical Detachment (RA) had no adverse effects on the brigade aeromedical evacuation capability because the unit had previously directed the bulk of its resources in support of the 101st Airborne Division.

The alternate FM net was utilized to relay information on the type of casualties aboard to the medical groups which in turn directed the aircraft to the appropriate destination hospital.

[13] The 28 Day Master Menu, SB10-261, dated 6 May 1968, was made available to field ration messes in II, III, and IV CTZ, to include hospitals, on 8 September 1968.

[13] Carbonated beverages were made available to post-operative patients through the local Post Exchange facilities which in turn billed U.S. Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam.

The formula, allowing one LVN for the first 40 persons served and one employee for each 40 thereafter, was applied theater wide to messes without regard to the vastly different functions of hospital feeding.

Recommendations, justification and job descriptions to obtain an increased authorization for local national employees for food service to patients of the wards were submitted and action was pending at the end of the reporting period.

By streamlining all phases of awards processing this time has been reduced to an average of ten to fourteen days, without sacrificing a high degree of evaluation and without additional personnel.

Forces, if admitted to US hospitals would be retained and treated only until their Military Intelligence classification had been completed and their medical condition stabilized to a point permitting transfer to an appropriate Government of Vietnam facility.

[14] Average monthly POW beds occupied[14] USARV published a directive on 20 August 1969 which governed the processing of returned, exchanged, or captured U.S. Army personnel.

Furthermore, a USARV directed action to its major subordinate components to conduct similar studies increased the slippage on the organization of the United States Army Medical Command, Vietnam (Provisional) until 1 March 1970.

[14] As a result of monitoring medical attendant after-action reports, it was discovered that a majority of the physicians complains stemmed from a lack of knowledge concerning administrative actions required while in Japan.

Care was provided for Vietnamese Civilians who were suffering from war related injuries and for those individuals requiring hospitalization for treatment not available at Government of Vietnam medical facilities.

When implemented, this program gave brigade units the capability of communicating with tactical elements in a secure mode, thus preventing enemy forces from acquiring vital intelligence data.

This was accomplished by a concomitant measure of success by stressing and enforcing on a command-wide basis the proper and timely execution of preventive maintenance services, and also by conserving wherever possible on the use of vehicular assets.

[14] Sandbags became in critical supply around mid-summer and remained so for the rest of 1969, during which they were authorized for use by tactical elements only, making it necessary for all brigade units to use expedient materials for constructing protective shelters and revetments.

The dietitian also assisted the II Field Force, Vietnam food service officer in developing a 28-day cycle menu which was more acceptable to the Thai Army which would be implemented by the 1st Logistical Command in 1970.