It was first formed in the Leningrad Military District in August, 1941, and continued in service in the northern sector of the Soviet-German front until the end of 1944.

The successful counterattack by 285th Rifle Division and 122nd Tank Brigade set the stage for 54th Army to participate in the general Soviet counter-offensive along the entire front.

The 115th and 198th Rifle Divisions then also arrived from Leningrad, joined the assault on the 15th, and helped drive the Germans back to Olomny by the 17th, enveloping the I Corps' left flank on the west bank of the Volkhov River.

In the final stages, elements of three rifle divisions cut the Mga – Kirishi rail line, but the army was unable to capture the latter stronghold, which would remain in German hands until the autumn of 1943.

Forty-eight hours of heavy fighting produced an advance of only 4 – 5km, after which a counterattack by 12th Panzer Division drove Fedyuninsky's troops back to their starting line.

[10] By mid-February 2nd Shock Army of Volkhov Front had driven across that river and was forcing its way through the swamps towards Lyuban, well in the German rear, but were unable to break out decisively toward Leningrad.

[14] 54th Army was only marginally involved in the Second Sinyavino Offensive during August – October, and was engaged in mostly local fighting through the balance of 1942.

At the beginning of 1943 its order of battle was as follows: On January 12, Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts launched Operation Iskra, which by the end of the month had finally opened a land corridor to the besieged city, but this also did not directly involve the 54th.

However, the success of Iskra, as well as the encirclement and destruction of German Sixth Army at Stalingrad and the subsequent offensives in the south, led STAVKA to plan a larger operation near Leningrad, to be called Operation Polyarnaya Zvezda (Pole Star), with the objective of the complete destruction of Army Group North.

At the beginning of October, after nearly two years of intermittent pressure, Army Group North evacuated the Kirishi salient to free up desperately needed reserves.

[21] In spite of this, the army group was in a very precarious position as the Soviet Fronts began planning a winter offensive.

[22] The plan that was issued to Roginsky between October and December must have looked familiar: a drive westwards towards Tosno, Lyuban and Chudovo as part of a short encirclement, followed by an advance southwest to Luga.

However, in the past year the German forces had grown weaker, the Soviets stronger, and the offensive would be launched on three attack axes.

Although the attack had only advanced 5km by Jan. 20, it was preventing German XXXVIII Army Corps from transferring forces to even harder-pressed sectors.

By the end of the month, the prospect of trapping the entire 18th Army presented as Roginsky's troops advanced on Luga from the northeast.

On the 30th, Hitler finally gave permission for 18th Army to pull back to the Luga River Defense Line, which was already compromised.

The next day, in a major regrouping, the 115th was transferred to 67th Army and Roginsky's headquarters redeployed to Novgorod to retake command of 111th as well as 119th Rifle Corps.

On the 17th this new command proposed that 54th and 8th Armies continue their offensive towards Ostrov, in order to breach the German Panther Line in that sector.

[26] During March and the first half of April, the depleted armies of Leningrad and 2nd Baltic Fronts were ordered into repeated attacks against this line, with meagre results reached at high cost.

Finally, 3rd Baltic Front joined the offensive on July 8, with the intention to breach the Panther Line and seize Ostrov and Pskov.

By the 19th, German 16th Army had pulled back to a switch line called the Lithuania position, but Soviet forces kept going, and Pskov had to be given up on the 22nd.