[7] The regiment was recruited in Allen, Auglaize, Champaign, Clinton, Cuyahoga, Fayette, Greene, Highland, Lake, Logan, Morgan, and Preble counties.

[16] Their Western Theater commander, Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston, made the controversial decision to quit the region, and despite political unhappiness in Richmond, his consolidation of troops further south precluded being could cut off in Kentucky and major portions of Tennessee.

[30][31]The regiment spent the next fortnight in camp training, drilling, preparing for the expected advance, and patrolling south in the woods towards Corinth.

[25][note 7] The Union plan was to combine Grant's and Buell's armies and continue south[34] and capture Corinth, which would be a springboard to take Memphis, Vicksburg, and large portions of Confederate territory.

Inexperience and bad weather caused the 20 miles (32 km) march north to take longer than he expected, and his troops were not in position until Saturday afternoon, April 5.

[39] On Friday, April 4, pickets under Col. Ralph P. Buckland[40] made contact with some of Johnston's cavalry who drove them back to about a 1.5 miles (2.4 km) in advance of his center, on the 54th Ohio's right on the main Corinth road.

Johnston's plan was to attack the Union left, pushing it northwest against the swampy land adjacent to Snake and Owl creeks.

[48] After hearing of sightings of Confederates at Seay Field, Col. Everett Peabody, commanding Prentiss' 1st Brigade, grew concerned, and around midnight Saturday, sent a five company patrol to investigate.

[56] Meanwhile, Prentiss was outraged to learn Peabody had sent out a patrol and accused him violating Grant's order to avoid provoking a major engagement.

[57] The five-company patrol partially spoiled the Confederate element of surprise and gave Stuart's brigade on the AoT's left, and the rest of the army, time albeit brief to stand to arms and form up.

[58] As the Zouaves and other regiments stood to arms, some Union commanders still were unconvinced that they were under attack, and Sherman himself was not convinced until his 7:00 a.m. ride to investigate the commotion near Rea Field.

[65][66] Grant ordered Nelson to march his division along the east side of the river to a point opposite Pittsburg Landing, where it could be ferried over to the battlefield.

At 7:30 a.m., Stuart received word from Prentiss that he had the enemy in his front in force followed by reports from his pickets that rebel infantry with artillery coming toward their position.

[76] Wallace's remaining brigades moved into positions near Duncan Field and what is now called the "Sunken Road," between McClernand's and Hurlbut's divisions.

[79] Around 9:40 a.m., the Zouaves began receiving artillery fire, and twenty minutes later, they and their brigade were attacked by Confederate infantry who drove the skirmishers back to their regiments.

[91] The continued shelling compelled Stuart to withdraw further, sheltering the command as well as possible by ravines and circuitous paths, finally reaching a cavalry camp just south of the landing where the brigade reformed.

[94] Through Malmborg's efforts, Smith commanded a line of over 3,000 men composed of the brigade augmented by remnants of other regiments who had retreated towards the landing.

[98]The Hornet's Nest bought Grant precious time to stabilize and prepare a defensive line from Pittsburg Landing to the Hamburg-Savannah Road and further north.

[117] Meanwhile, Grant attacked at the other end of the linen with Lew Wallace's fresh troops driving one of Bragg's exhausted rebel brigades from Jones Field.

[6] Smith, Stuart observed, was constantly rallying, encouraging, and fighting his men under incessant fire, disregarding his personal safety,[87] and the Confederates were pushed back.

Further west, McCook's advance westward on the Corinth-Pittsburg Landing Road opened a gap with Crittenden that Grant filled with AoT brigades from his reserve.

[120] Despite light opposition at his front, Lew Wallace halted his men in a defensive position, and did not resume the offensive until Sherman and McClernand had stopped and pushed back Cheatham.

[116] Further rebel counterattacks proved only temporary successes and Beauregard was forced back, and Union troops crossed the Hamburg-Purdy Road at 2:30 p.m.[122] Stuart, as an observer, was impressed with the performance of regiments, Smith, Malmborg, and his aide from the 54th Ohio, Loomis.

After learning that Van Dorn was too far away to help him,[123] Beauregard, around 2:00 p.m., had Breckinridge form a rear guard near Shiloh Church where rebel artillery around it began a bombardment to deceive Grant and Buell was still present.

[138][137] Meanwhile, on April 7, while Grant and Buell were driving Beauregard from the field, Pope's AoM captured Island Number 10, opening the river almost as far south as Memphis.

[141] Hallek now had an artmy of over 100,000, but leery due to staggering losses at Shiloh, he began a slow, methodical campaign of offensive entrenchment, fortifying after each advance.

[note 22] On Wednesday, Sherman stressed strict discipline and alertness as they were in rebel country, ordering combat readiness at all times, finding a reliable water supply, ensuring daily drills, and robust guards on all regimental camps.

[147] After a day of hard working on the road and defenses on Tuesday, Sherman sent out orders to march the next morning 2 miles (3.2 km)to the west, or right, heading toward the M&ORR north of Corinth to build further fortifications.

While Pope, at Hallek's direction, made a "fuss and demonstration" to distract the rebels on the left,[149] the 54th Ohio moved with its division 2 miles (3.2 km)southwest to another ridge, Camp No.

6, Sherman planned an attack against Chalmers' brigade, which was in a strong defensive position at the Russell House on the next rise to the south overlooking Phillips Creek.