[3] The division fought in the unsuccessful offensive at Kursk in the summer of 1943, suffering heavy losses in men and equipment and was further degraded in the subsequent Soviet counteroffensive.

After fighting defensively across Prussia and Northern Germany, the surviving men escaped into the forest and surrendered to the British Army northwest of Berlin in May 1945.

[6] Upon taking command on 10 February 1940, Rommel quickly set his unit to practicing the maneuvers they would need in the upcoming campaign.

[9] Rommel was active in the forward areas, directing the efforts to make a crossing, which were initially unsuccessful due to suppressive fire by the French on the other side of the river.

By 16 May, the division had reached its assigned objective at Avesnes-sur-Helpe, where the original plan called for him to stop and await further orders, but Rommel pressed on.

He may have overestimated the size of the British forces in the area, or he may have wished to reserve the bulk of the armour for the drive on Paris.

[17] From here they moved north, blocking the westward route to Le Havre and the Operation Cycle evacuations and forcing over 10,000 men of the 51st (Highland) Division, French 9th Army Corps and other supporting troops to surrender at Saint-Valery-en-Caux on 12 June.

[18][19] On 17 June, the division was ordered to advance on Cherbourg Naval Base, where additional British evacuations were underway as part of Operation Aerial.

The division advanced 240 kilometres (150 mi) in 24 hours, and after two days of shelling, the French garrison surrendered on 19 June.

[21] After the armistice with the French was signed on 22 June, the division was placed in reserve, being sent first to the Somme and then to Bordeaux to re-equip and prepare for Unternehmen Seelöwe (Operation Sea Lion), the planned invasion of Britain.

[23] In February, the division was placed in reserve and returned to Germany, with General Hans von Funck assuming command.

For reasons of deception and security, it remained in Bonn up until 8 June 1941, when the division was loaded onto 64 trains and transported by rail to the eastern frontier.

The division assembled in East Prussia southeast of Lötzen in preparation for Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union.

Resistance at the border was weaker than expected and brushed aside, the tanks of the division raced forward, covering the 60 km to reach the Neman River at Olita (Alytus) by midday.

Shortly thereafter, the Soviets initiated a series of fierce counter-attacks, bringing the German advance to an abrupt halt.

[27] Firing from hull down positions on the reverse slopes of hillsides, they caused the panzer forces their first combat losses.

Unlike previous campaigns, when the Red Army positions were outflanked and cut off, the Soviet defenders frequently continued to fight rather than surrender, even though their situation was hopeless.

Though creating pockets of resistance, the Soviet command was unable to mount a linear defense, and the vital road and rail communications north east of Minsk were cut on 26 June, only four days into Operation Barbarossa.

In another week, however, pressure from all sides had squeezed the pocket out of existence and the division was finally relieved by infantry units, and taken out of line for refitting and rest.

[32] By January 1942, six months from the start of the offensive, the division had suffered 2,055 killed, 5,737 wounded, with 313 missing and another 1,089 sick with frostbite and louse-borne diseases.

[32] In mid-May, the division was transported by rail to southern France, where it was assigned to coastal protection duties with the 1st Army under the command of von Funck.

On 11 November, the division, as part of Case Anton, was sent to previously Vichy France, to reach the Mediterranean coast between Perpignan and Narbonne.

Assembling in a staging area around Aix-en-Provence, the division prepared for Operation Lila, the seizure of the Vichy French fleet at the naval port of Toulon, to prevent them falling into Allied hands.

By nightfall, the attackers had driven 24 kilometers into the Red Army flank and isolated the forward elements of the Soviet offensive.

Success was short lived, however, as further Soviet reinforcements advancing behind the lead elements confronted the German counterattack and reduced the combat effectiveness of the Wehrmacht formations.

In January 1945, the Soviet 2nd Belorussian Front mounted a massive attack and broke through the defenses of the 2nd Army, which was forced back north and west.

Historian Raffael Scheck says, "Although there is no evidence incriminating Rommel himself, his unit did fight in areas where German massacres of French prisoners of war were extremely common in June 1940.

French historian Dominique Lormier [fr] states the number of victims of the division in Airaines at 109, mostly French-African soldiers from Senegal.

[46] Historian Daniel Butler agrees that it was possible the massacre at Le Quesnoy happened given the existence of Nazis like Karl Hanke in the division, while stating that in comparison with other German units, few sources regarding such actions of the men of the division exist (Butler believes that "it's almost impossible to imagine" Rommel authorizing or countenancing such actions, in either case[47]).

[49] The organisation structure of the 7th Panzer Division of the German Heer (May 10, 1940), in preparation to the Battle of France was as follows:[50] The divisional artillery consisted at this time of 24 towed 105 mm LeFH (light field howitzers).