He therefore set his signal levers to danger so as to stop the coal train, but it continued on the main line until it reached Abbots Ripton, where as expected the signalman waved it on to his box with a hand lamp, and directed it to shunt.

The goods train had nearly completed shunting into the Abbots Ripton siding when the Scotch express ran into it at speed.

To stop a train, the driver could shut off steam, get his fireman to apply a handbrake[note 3] on the tender and put the engine into reverse.

In trials carried out after the accident under favourable conditions this was shown to bring the train to rest within 800–1,150 yards (2,400–3,450 feet) when travelling at 40–45 mph (64–72 km/h).

The Railway Inspectors considered that much shorter stopping distances would be possible if passenger trains were provided with continuous brakes operable by the driver, and had urged such systems be fitted.

Notable passengers included the Russian Ambassador, the deputy chairman[note 5] and another director[note 6] of the Great Northern, and a director (John Cleghorn, formerly company secretary) and the chief engineer (Thomas Elliot Harrison, a past president of the Institution of Civil Engineers) of the North Eastern Railway.

The signalman urged the driver to hurry up, as he was "keeping the Scotchman standing at Wood Walton (the previous signal box)".

[9] The signalman at Holme had been concerned that, because the coal train was so late, if it went on to Abbots Ripton before shunting into a siding the Flying Scotsman would be delayed.

The Holme station master told the enquiry that he then sent for the platelayers; whilst waiting for them he checked the up line home signal and saw it to be at 'danger'.

It did not slacken speed for the bad weather; it passed through Holme at about 6.37, the signals all showing clear, and arrived at Wood Walton at 6.40.

He told the inquiry he was busy stopping a train of empty coal wagons on the down line, and because of the weather he did not hear the express until it ran past his cabin at full speed.

The railway workers involved were badly shaken – some admitted it took them a few minutes to fully gather their wits[note 10] but the guards (whose duty it was to 'protect their train') were affected to a lesser extent.

The guard of the express walked back up the up line towards Wood Walton, laying fog-signals (detonators) on the rails to warn any further trains to stop.

Instead he tried to send a message reporting the crash and seeking assistance by the speaking telegraph to Huntingdon station to the south.

[9][note 13] He prefixed the message with the special 'SP' code indicating top priority but the signalman at Huntingdon did not answer.

At 6.52, after trying and failing for 8 minutes to pass his message to Huntingdon South, the Abbots Ripton signalman sent the 5-beat 'obstruction danger' bell signal to Stukeley.

The down Leeds express passed through Huntingdon at about 6.49 (at which time no message had been accepted from Abbots Ripton) and reached Stukeley at 6.52.

The Abbots Ripton down distant signal was showing 'all clear' and the Leeds express approached it at full speed.

In another instant I met an engine on the up road giving sharp whistles,[note 15] and saw a red lamp from it, which I took to mean that there was something out of the ordinary way.

[note 17] On the night of the accident the weight of snow on some signal arms and wires meant that the arm balanced well short of the 'danger' position and that the spectacle plate failed to drop sufficiently to move a red lens in front of the white lamp displayed in the "all clear" position.

The signal therefore showed a white light ("all clear") when the lever in the signal box was in fact set to danger; the snow and ice (in the words of the Inquiry Report) thus rendered the signals not only useless for warning by red-lights the engine-driver of the Scotch-express-train, but also a means by the exhibition of white lights of luring him forward at full speed to the collision.The inquiry had heard evidence from experienced working-level witnesses that this (or a milder manifestation of this) was a known problem on snowy days but could easily be sorted if you knew how, e.g., by "jiggling the arms".

It implicitly rejected the evidence from GNR senior managers who denied that there was any prior history of problems, but made no comment on the discrepancy.

[note 18] Operating practice at that time was that the signals were left in the 'clear' position continuously unless protecting a static obstruction.

The inquiry report noted various suggested improvements to signal arrangements, but cautioned against over-elaborate solutions: It is well that these and other proposals for improvement, which are constantly invented or advocated, such as combining sight with sound at the signals, and the use of detonators, mechanically applied, to supersede the use of fogmen, should receive full consideration and discussion, after the experience of so terrible an accident, caused mainly by the failure of existing signal-arrangements.

But, in the course of such deliberations, the facts must not be lost sight of, that men are still liable to make mistakes, machinery is still liable to fail, and further complication is by no means certain in all cases to produce greater safety.It commented adversely on the performance of individuals: and, without blaming individuals, on The Board of Trade had no regulatory powers to enforce the recommendations of the inquiry report.

[16] Notes ..he did not think it right to find the Holme stationmaster guilty of manslaughter; for it was a heavy responsibility to stop a train without urgent reason, and he placed confidence in the block system which, it appeared, had never failed except on this fatal night.