In the History of the Great War, James Edmonds wrote that "The fighting [from 13 to 14 October] had not improved the general situation in any way and had brought nothing but useless slaughter of infantry".

Crown Prince Rupprecht the Sixth Army commander and some Western Front generals had objected to this policy, as an invitation to German troops to retreat rather than fight.

After the experience of the Battle of Festubert, where Allied artillery had proved capable of destroying a great width of front trench, opposition had been abandoned and the work carried on as quickly as possible.

In early May Falkenhayn had also ordered that a second defensive position be built 2,000–3,000 yd (1.1–1.7 mi; 1.8–2.7 km) behind the whole of the Western Front, to force an attacker to pause to move artillery forward into range.

The British New Armies had begun to arrive, the number of heavy guns had increased since the offensives of May and June and by concentrating resources at the points of attack an even greater numerical superiority could be obtained over the Germans.

It was agreed that in Artois a Franco-British offensive would be mounted towards Douai, by the French Tenth and the British First armies, co-ordinated by General Foch on a front of 20 miles (32 km) between Arras and La Bassée canal.

The infantry were to advance as an "irresistible mass", with reserves arranged in depth to move forward at the same time as the leading troops, ready to take over and maintain the momentum of the assault.

Such tactics were expected to break through both German defensive positions and enable the cavalry to rush forward and widen the breakthroughs, before advancing on distant objectives in Belgium.

[9] On 25 September, the two leading battalions of the 26th Brigade attacked from the jumping-off trench at 6:30 a.m., under the cover of the gas discharge, a smoke-shell barrage from Stokes mortars and phosphorus grenades, which formed a thick yellow screen.

The gas and smoke persisted for long enough for the first infantry companies in the attack to form up behind it, ready to advance when the British artillery lifted off the German front trenches.

As the British emerged from the screen they were engaged by fire from Madagascar ("Mad") Point to the left, which inflicted many losses on the first lines of infantry.

The battalions at the objective were ordered to dig in and consolidate Corons Trench to cover Fosse 8, because the 2nd Division to the north had been repulsed from Auchy village.

A further advance towards Haisnes was made impossible, when the 28th Brigade was stopped in front of Madagascar ("Mad") Trench and the area around Fosse 8 was consolidated to be ready for a counter-attack from the north or the north-east.

The infantry and a field company dug a step above the water-level, as German troops in communication trenches nearby, inflicted many more casualties with machine-gun and rifle-fire.

Four 2.75-inch Mountain guns were moved forward from Annequin at 9:15 a.m. and were ready to block a German advance from Auchy or Haisnes by 10:30 a.m.; a field artillery battery arrived soon after.

[11] The 28th Division (Major-General Edward Bulfin was sent to hold part of the line against German counter-attacks and a quarter of its men were killed in the following week.

The official history of the war suggested that "The fighting on the 13th–14th October had not improved the general situation in any way and had brought nothing but useless slaughter of infantry.

"[17] General Sir Douglas Haig thought it might be possible to launch another attack on 7 November but heavy rain and accurate German shelling during the second half of October finally persuaded him to abandon the attempt.

[20] Over the winter months, the 170th Tunnelling Company RE dug several galleries under the German lines, in the Hohenzollern Redoubt area, which had changed hands several times since September 1915.

In March 1916, the Germans had an unobstructed view of the British positions, from a slag heap named Fosse 8 and in previous mining operations, no man's land had become a crater field.

The British front line was held by outposts, to reduce the number of troops vulnerable to mine explosions and the strain of knowing that the ground could erupt at any moment.