The Captain initiated a go-around maneuver, but the aeroplane impacted terrain approximately 1,500 feet (460 m) short of the runway, striking a mound in an open field and sliding across the frozen ground for about 300 m.[2] Four crew members and 95 passengers were killed in the accident.

[3] According to the commission, the crew had no reason to stop the approach 9 seconds before the collision, and deflecting the elevator all the way to pitch up was an attempt to reduce the vertical speed and hold the plane on the glide path.

Based on the test results, the front centering limit was changed from 18 to 16.5% of the MAC, but this did not compensate for the decrease in the longitudinal control margin and was insufficient for safe operation.

The Norilsk plane crash led to the need to conduct tests, according to the results of which the State Research Institute of Civil Aviation established that the minimum level of longitudinal controllability in the established modes can be ensured only with an alignment of 22% of the MAR or more, or with an alignment of 20% of the MAR, but subject to an increase in the approach speed landing by 10 km/h, compared to that recommended in the Aircraft flight manual.

[4] Despite the results of flight tests in 1974-1975 and 1979, which revealed design flaws in the Tu-154B aircraft, the rush to introduce and start operating new models led to the fact that the Tupolev Design Bureau did not take any constructive measures to increase the longitudinal control margin airliner, and the leadership of the State Research Institute of Civil Aviation simply did not control this moment.