At 03:04 Moscow time (63 minutes into the flight), the crew extended the flaps to the landing position (38°) as per the manual.

The forces applied to the pedal (15 kg) merely held the rudder in a neutral position, failing to counteract the yawing moment.

However, this measure was ineffective, so the crew moved the remaining operational right engine to takeoff mode, forgetting that, according to the manual, they should first level the aircraft out of the left bank and into a right one.

Twenty-five seconds after the left engine shutdown, the aircraft, with a 40° nose-down angle and a 3° left bank, flying at a heading of 15°, hit the ground at a forward speed of 320 km/h and a vertical speed of 40 m/s, 8 kilometers from the runway threshold on an azimuth of 15° (500 meters from the runway centerline).

The airliner was completely destroyed on impact, and the debris scattered over an area of 136 by 40 meters, but no fire ensued.

The KV-9-1 micro switch in actual operational conditions within DAF-24 was not reliable against vibration loads, and from 1981 to 1985, there had been 22 cases of such failures.

During periodic inspections of the DAF-24, conducted every 300±30 hours, detecting all instances of KV-9-1 micro switch wear was impossible, and the failures were not eliminated even after the industry implemented special measures.

[2] Regarding the crew's actions, simulation results indicated that if the crew had intervened in the yaw control within the first eight seconds of the emergency situation (engine shutdown) and countered the yawing moment by deflecting the rudder to 10°, while half-deflecting the ailerons, the aircraft would have banked right and maintained straight flight on the set descent trajectory.

In this situation, the crew made piloting errors, leading to a loss of speed and a stall, followed by the aircraft's collision with the ground."