The case received much scholarly and media attention on the requirements for marriage and the protection of vulnerable spouses.

The issue was whether the 1998 ceremony created a "non-marriage" (which Mr. Khan and the Attorney General argued), or whether it created a void marriage in respect of which a decree of nullity could be pronounced, thereby entitling the wife to apply for financial remedy orders, which Mrs. Ahkter argued.

In NA v MSK [2018] EWFC 54, Williams J held that by reason of the husband's actions, there was no valid marriage.

[10] When considering the question of a marriage the court had to take a holistic view of a process rather than a single ceremony, taking into account whether: the ceremony or event set out or purported to be a lawful marriage, including whether the parties had agreed that the necessary legal formalities would be undertaken; it bore all or enough of the hallmarks of marriage including whether it was in public, whether it was witnessed, whether promises were made; the three key participants, most importantly the officiating official, believed, intended and understood the ceremony as giving rise to the status of lawful marriage; the failure to complete all the legal formalities was a joint decision or due to the failure of one party to complete them.

[14] The Court of Appeal also held: "As referred to above, however, we agree with observations that have been made about the unsatisfactory nature of the expression “non-marriage”.

The determination of whether a marriage is void or not cannot, in our view, be wholly (or in part) dependent on future events, such as the intention to undertake another ceremony or whether there are children.

Finally, the parties were aware that the Nikah had no legal effect and failed to take a subsequent ceremony to make their marriage valid.

[20] The case had generated much media attention and was criticized for failing to protect Muslim women who have no rights when it comes to divorce.

[1][2][21][22] Southall Black Sisters warned that the judgment would "outsource" justice on family matters to unaccountable and fundamentalist-inspired community-based systems of religious arbitration; it considered the matter not about recognising religious marriages; it is about the state guaranteeing equality to all before the law.

[2] The Guardian had supported Williams J's original judgment, considering that it allowed married women to gain rights without "violating anyone's religious conscience".

[23] Tristan Cummings at Merton College, Oxford similarly criticized the Court of Appeal's judgment for over-relying on technical correctness rather than the "long-standing and ongoing hardships faced by religious minorities in a family law system historically constructed around Anglican family norms".