APGC conducted realistic testing of new weapons as an independent organization, reporting directly to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and advocating a "fly-before-buy" approach to acquiring new systems.

Such a shift, however, remained a challenge, for the Air Force continued the "buy-fly-fix" process that had grown from the demands of the Second World War and undervalued the importance of timely independent operational test and evaluation.

By 1956, Air Force regulations outlined an eight-phase test and evaluation process that did not include the APGC until phase seven.

By that point in the acquisition cycle, the Air Force had often already fielded units with new systems that APGC had not yet tested.

This action meant the Air Force no longer had an independent organization that specialized in impartial operational test and evaluation.

The consequences became clear when a Department of Defense study found that 21 of 22 major weapons systems used in the Vietnam War from 1965 to 1970 suffered severe operational deficiencies.

While "fly-before-buy" has repeatedly proven its worth in thorough testing of systems and avoidance of later problems, the Air Force even in the twenty-first century remains severely hampered by a "buy-fly-fix" approach.

Literally billions of dollars have been spent in making weapons systems operational after they have entered squadron service.