On 25 December 2012, the aircraft crash-landed short of the runway at Heho Airport in fog, coming to a stop in a paddy field and bursting into flames.

[1][2][3] The Myanmar Accident Investigation Bureau (MAIB) concluded that the pilots had not followed the proper procedure for an approach to Heho.

During their landing attempt, the crew decided to continue their descent below the minimum decision altitude (MDA) even though they had not obtained visual contact with the runway.

[4] On approaching Heho, air traffic control reported local weather conditions to the crew as wind calm, visibility 3000 m and "distinct fog."

At about 08:47 local time, the crew initiated a non-precision NDB approach procedure to Heho 's runway 36.

Approximately 10 nautical miles from the airport, the crew reported that they had obtained visual contact with the runway.

At 08:53 local time, about 1.3 km (0.7 nmi) from the runway threshold, the aircraft struck power lines and trees.

[4] In response to the crash, survivors of foreign nationalities were provided with accommodation in Yangon's Kandawgyi Palace Hotel, USD$2,000, and 300,000 Buremse kyat for buying clothes and other essentials.

The team was headed by the Deputy Director General of the department, U Win Swe Tun, and consisted of four other members.

[16] Initial statements by the authorities suggested that the pilots mistook a road for the airport's runway in low visibility.

[17][18] Managing director of Air Bagan U Thet Htoo Htwe stated that the aircraft was airworthy and that both pilots had followed the standard operating procedures.

The standard operating procedures from Air Bagan stated that a flight officer was not allowed to conduct a landing in inclement weather condition and should be assigned as the PNF to monitor the aircraft's instruments.

The aircraft kept descending and the crew were still not able to obtain visual contact with the runway as the presence of fog had deteriorated the visibility.

As the crew were pre-occupied with the landing, the captain couldn't address the flight officer on problems regarding the aircraft's position and rate of descent.

[4] The final report concluded that the primary cause of the accident was the crew's decision to descend below the approach procedure's minimum descent altitude of 160 metres (530 ft) without having the runway in sight.

At that point, the airline's standard operating procedure would have called for an aborted landing to be immediately initiated.

The report cited as contributory factors the captain's inadequate risk assessment in designating the first officer as pilot flying for the approach in the given weather conditions, and an increased pressure on the flight crew to complete the landing due to the presence of other aircraft on approach to Heho at the time.