Along with these texts, the sayings and opinions of the Sceptics (ajñānikāḥ, ajñānināḥ) has been preserved by Jain writer Silanka, from the ninth century, commenting on the Sutrakritanga.
In Brahmanas and Early Upanishads doubt regarding a person's existence after death is cast, while the Yajñavalkya argued for the impossibility of knowing the ultimate reality or the atman.
[5] However the flourishing of sceptical thoughts seems to have occurred in a period with diverse, conflicting, and irreconcilable theories, regarding morality, metaphysics, and religious beliefs.
It is natural, in the absence of a commonly accepted criterion of truth, for some people to wonder if any theory could be true at all.
[7] A proliferation of view points existed during the period immediately preceding the rise of Buddhism, as attested in the Buddhist and Jain texts.
While the list is artificially constructed according to Jain categories, the four main schools of thought, Kriyavada, Akriyavada, Ajnanikavada, and Vainayikavada, and their subgroups must have existed.
Silanka quotes, "They posit the theory that since those who claim knowledge make mutually contradictory assertions, they cannot be stating the truth."
Regarding Sceptic's point of view, Silanka in his commentary writes, as translated by Jayatilleke: For they (i.e. the Sceptics) say that those who claim knowledge (jñaninah) cannot be stating actual facts since their statements are mutually contradictory, for even with regard to the category of the soul, some assert that the soul is omnipresent (sarvagatam) and other that it is not omnipresent (asarvagatam), some (say) it is of the size of a digit (angustaparvamatram) others that it is of the size of a kernel of a grain of millet (syamakatandulamatram) some say it both has form and is formless (murtamamurtam), some that it resides in the heart (hrdayamadhyavartinam) and (others) that it is located in the forehead (lalatavyavasthitam), etc.
with the (knowledge of) the near portion, considering the unrepresented parts out of the three parts, it is not possible to apprehend the atom by those with a limited vision owing to the excellence of its nature; therefore, since there is no omniscient person and since one who is not omniscient cannot comprehend the nature of an object as it is constituted, since all the theorists (sarvavadinam) have conceived of the nature of the categories in a mutually contradictory manner and those who have claimed super-knowledge (uttarapari-jñaninam) are at fault (paramdavatam) Scepticism is best owing to the magnitude of the mistakes that arise (from claims of knowledge).
[13]This may also be the reason why the Sceptics held to another dictum that All teachings are like the utterances of barbarians since they have no (epistemic) basis.
According to Jayatilleke's interpretation of the passage given by Silanka, perception is divided into near, middle, and outer, and we perceive only the near; so each person's view of what they see of an object will be different according their perspective.
However, these sixty-seven types are obtained combinatorially by taking nine categories (navapadartha) of Jainism, each with seven forms of predication (saptabhangakah), to give sixty-three (9 × 7) forms of sceptical questions, which were considered to represent sixty-three "types" of Sceptics asking these questions.
The last four questions are:[18] Such psychological speculations seem to be rife during this era, as evinced in Pali Nikayas, especially the Potthapada Sutta.
[18] In the Pali texts, the Sceptics are nicknamed Amarāvikkhepikas, which translates as "eel-wrigglers," probably in reference to their "verbal jugglery."
[24] However, according to Jayatilleke, this was probably not a temporary suspension of judgement, until new information could come by to make a better evaluation; but rather it was meant to be a permanent state of affair by outright denying the very possibility of knowledge, and hence of questions regarding morality.
[25] Thus, their Scepticism is motivated by both intellectual as well as moral reasoning (i.e. fear of asserting falsehood due to one's prejudices).
[28] In Brahmajala Sutta, the third school of Scepticism is shown to put forward such arguments in support for their view point: I do not know, as it really is, what is good and what is evil and not knowing, if I were to pronounce that this is good or this is evil, then I would have to join issue, argue and debate with recluses and brahmins, learned, subtle, hair-splitters, skilled in controversy, who go about debunking with their intellect the theories of others.
[29] Sanjaya is described as a contemporary of the Buddha, as a well-known and celebrated teacher, and as a leader of a sect who was held in high esteem by the common folk.
[29] In Brahmajala Sutta, this fourth school of Sceptics is described as thus: Herein a certain recluse or brahmin is dull, stupid.
[34] Indeed, two of the foremost disciples of Buddha, Sariputta and Moggallāna, were initially the students of Sanjaya; and a strong element of skepticism is found in early Buddhism, most particularly in the Aṭṭhakavagga sutra.
In particular, he lists the following: (1) There were no beliefs or opinions which were true or false and therefore (2) we should give no positive answer to any of the logical alternatives.
[37] Scholars including Barua, Jayatilleke, and Flintoff, contend that Pyrrho was influenced by, or at the very least agreed with, Indian scepticism rather than Buddhism or Jainism, based on the fact that he valued ataraxia, which can be translated as "freedom from worry".
[37] If this is true, then the methods of the Ajñānins may be preserved in the extant work by the Pyrrhonist philosopher Sextus Empiricus.