The Supreme Court held that the claim should be either stayed or struck out, but deferred making an order as to which pending further representations from the parties.

Mr Al-Sanea was a citizen and resident of Saudi Arabia, and he was closely involved with a Cayman Islands company, Saad Investments Co Ltd (SICL).

Mr Al-Sanea was the registered legal owner of shares in five Saudi Arabian banks, valued at around US$318 million.

In the Supreme Court the primary issue was whether the overreaching of a beneficial interest in trust property by the trustee transferring it to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice amounted to a "disposition" for the purposes of section 127 of the Insolvency Act 1986.

But then largely dismissed that as background, noting: "In the light of the further and more broadly ranging submissions which the Supreme Court has now received, I doubt if it matters for present purposes either whether the Convention applies or even whether SICL's interests in relation to the shares can properly be described as proprietary.

He also referred to British South Africa Co v De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd [1910] 2 Ch 502 where the Court of Appeal held that the equitable rule against clogging the equity of redemption of a mortgage applied to a contract governed by English law and would be enforced against a contracting party as regards land abroad in a foreign country where the equity of redemption may not be recognised.

"[11] But he refused to be drawn into the deeper academic debate: "It is unnecessary on this appeal to examine these slightly differing analyses further.

Any such disposition will involve issues which arise directly between the company (embracing in that concept its creditors in liquidation) whose property is disposed of and the other party to the transaction, although the section embraces situations where the company's property is held by, for example, a director or agent and is disposed of by him to a third party: In re J Leslie Engineers Co Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 292.

He added that: "In some circumstances, the term "disposition" may, as Lord Neuberger demonstrates, embrace destruction or extinction of an interest.

But the natural meaning of "disposition" in the context of section 127 is in my view that it refers to a transfer by a disponor to a disponee of the relevant property".

Lord Neuberger summarised the facts briefly, and then turned to the direct issue in the case as to whether the overreaching of the beneficial interest in trust property could be a "disposition" for the purposes section 127 of the Insolvency Act 1986.

He stated that: "There is no doubt but that SICL's equitable interest in the shares constituted "property" in the light of the very wide definition of that expression in section 436 of the 1986 Act, which is set out in para 7 of Lord Mance's judgment.

He cited with approval what Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C said in Bristol Airport Plc v Powdrill [1990] Ch 744, 759, "[i]t is hard to think of a wider definition of property".

[15] He expressed his view that the word "disposition" is linguistically capable of applying to a transaction which involves the destruction or termination of an interest.

He claimed academic support for such a view, citing Professor Sir Roy Goode in Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (4th ed (2011) at para 13–127).

He also drew support from Wynn-Parry J in In re Earl Leven, Inland Revenue Comrs v Williams Deacon's Bank Ltd [1954] 1 WLR 1228, 1233.

He then proceeded to review much of the background law in relation to the fact pattern, noting that as the beneficiary of a trust, SICL had two main legal rights.

He noted that the proprietary character of an equitable interest in property has sometimes been doubted, but an equitable interest possesses the essential hallmark of any right in rem, and it is enforceable against third parties, subject to the rules of equity for the protection of bona fide purchasers for value without notice, per Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669, 705.

The principle is the same as that which applies where a person assumes a contractual obligation to transfer an interest which is incapable of existing under the lex situs.

He approved the statement by Lord Hodge in In re Joint Administrators of Rangers Football Club Plc 2012 SLT 599, para 19: "while the contractual aspects of a contract to assign corporeal moveables are governed by the law applicable to the contractual obligation, the final question of proprietary right must be determined by the lex situs.

But Lord Sumption indicated that he would reject it is because of equity's recognition that in some circumstances the conscience of the holder of the legal interest may be affected.

[21] Finally he concluded that "for the purpose of section 127 of the Insolvency Act 1986 there was no disposition of any rights of SICL in relation to the shares by virtue of their transfer to Samba.

Lord Collins noted the unfortunate way that the arguments had evolved, to the extent that leave was given to appeal to the Supreme Court on one ground, and then largely argued on another.

[23] He expanded that "For the reasons given by Lord Mance, I do not consider that there was any "disposition" of SICL's property" and so "It follows that the scope and effect of the Hague Convention do not fall to be decided.

Attorney General v Jewish Colonisation Association [1901] 1 QB 123 and Duke of Marlborough v Attorney General [1945] Ch 78 are only indirect authority, but they have been, correctly, regarded as recognising English trusts over foreign shares irrespective of whether the place of incorporation or place of registration recognises the trust concept.

[33] Akers v Samba has been cited with approval in a subsequent case in the same litigation: Byers v Saudi National Bank [2024] UKSC 51.