[1][2][3][4] The issues which the Supreme Court had to determine were limited because of certain procedural irregularities in the way that the defendant, the Samba Financial Group, had conducted its defence.

A raft of litigation then ensued, but most importantly the liquidators brought claims against Samba alleging that the transfers by Mr Al-Sanea were void under the provisions of section 127 of the Insolvency Act 1986.

They conclude their review by upholding the decision of the High Court, that: "While it may be legitimate to refer to knowing receipt as a species of equitable wrongdoing, it is not based exclusively on fault.

They noted that Fancourt J had explained the reasons for his conclusions in a careful and detailed section of the Judgment running to 88 paragraphs, and they summarised his findings as follows: "The Courts of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia do not apply foreign law.

"[16] They noted the general rule in relation to appeals against matters of fact, as expressed by Lewison LJ in FAGE UK Ltd v Chobani UK Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 5 at paragraph 114: "Appellate courts have been repeatedly warned, by recent cases at the highest level, not to interfere with findings of fact by trial judges, unless compelled to do so."

They also cited the warning of Lord Reed in Henderson v Foxworth Investments Ltd [2014] UKSC 41 at paragraph 67: "It follows that, in the absence of some other identifiable error, such as (without attempting an exhaustive account) a material error of law, or the making of a critical finding of fact which has no basis in the evidence, or a demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence, or a demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence, an appellate court will interfere with the findings of fact made by a trial judge only if it is satisfied that his decision cannot reasonably be explained or justified."

At first instance Fancourt J had held that a 'block discount' was appropriate to assess the true value of a large number of shares in the same company being sold on the market at the same time.

However the entire court agreed that a claim in knowing receipt is precluded where the claimant's proprietary equitable interest has been extinguished or overridden by the time that the recipient received the property.

In terms of first principles, Lord Briggs noted that it was a cornerstone of equity from the time of Pilcher v Rawlins (1872) LR 7 Ch App 259 that where a trustee transferred trust property to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice then that purchaser would take absolutely free of beneficiary's equitable interests.

Lord Briggs noted that although Samba, and its successor the Saudi National Bank, were not literally bona fide purchasers for value without notice, they were effectively in the same position as the proper law of the transfers (Saudi law) had extinguished the equitable title of the beneficiaries (as determined in Akers v Samba Financial Group [2017] UKSC 6).

This would be true whether the equitable title was extinguished by a bona purchaser for value without notice, or by the operation of foreign law or any other basis.

He rejected the appellants argument that liability in knowing receipt was dependent upon whether the conscience of the recipient was affected rather than the existence of the proprietary interest.

He considered two authorities particularly important, the first of which was Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock (No 3) [1968] 1 WLR 1555, and the second was Re Montagu's Settlement Trusts [1987] Ch 264.

He thought the better approach was to categorises a claim in knowing receipt as an "equitable proprietary wrong", and provide that it failed in the absence of a supporting property right.

The attempt to rationalise the case law on the basis that knowing receipt should be characterised as "equitable proprietary wrong" is reached at paragraphs [157]-[158].

Ultimately he, like Lord Briggs, concludes with a short and direct paragraph: "I conclude that, where there has been the transfer of an asset to a defendant in breach of trust, there can be no claim for knowing receipt where the claimant, the beneficiary under the trust, has no continuing equitable proprietary interest in the asset received by the defendant.

"[20] The decision in the High Court was commented upon at length in the Law Quarterly Review by Professor Ben McFarlane and Sinead Agnew.

[21] The authors note that the decision creates academic tension between the 'proprietary' and 'relational' views of equity; they endorse the comments of Fancourt J that the analysis has important conceptual consequences for purely domestic law.