'Organization of the Base in the Arabian Peninsula' or تنظيم قاعدة الجهاد في جزيرة العرب romanized: Tanẓīm Qā‘idat al-Jihād fī Jazīrat al-‘Arab, lit.

[33] Its strength has since waned due to internal struggles and operations waged against them by multiple parties in the civil war, as well as through an ongoing drone campaign by the United States which has killed many of its senior leaders and members.

[33] In 2011, AQAP created Ansar al-Sharia (Arabic: جماعة أنصار الشريعة, Jamā‘at Anṣār ash-Sharī‘ah, "Group of the Helpers of the Sharia") as a subsidiary organization which would operate exclusively within Yemen.

Saleh obliged and agreed to coordinated several operations with the U.S. to defeat al-Qaeda, such as with a CIA drone strike on 3 November 2002 which killed AQY leader Abu Ali al-Harithi in Marib governorate.

[52] The group operates upon a gradualist approach in order to fulfil this goal, prioritizing the establishment of acceptance amongst local Yemenis before gaining popular support among the people, and then willingness from the populace to defend AQAP-held territory.

[38] AQAP asserts that Yemen should be the epicenter of jihad against America and secular Arab governments, as opposed to then-occupied Iraq or Afghanistan, as they deem it a religious obligation to expel "polytheists and apostates" from the Arabian Peninsula.

[53] The group eventually received widespread notoriety in December 2009 when they claimed responsibility for an attack in which Nigerian suicide bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate explosives in his underwear abroad Northwest Airlines Flight 253 while it was landing in Detroit, Michigan.

[53] Profiting off of outrage from a U.S. drone strike in May 2010 which killed government official Jaber Ali al-Shabwani,[69] AQAP launched a large series of attacks and assassinations' against security forces in Abyan, Hadramawt, Shabwah, Marib, Lahj and Aden governorates throughout spring 2010.

[76][77] Starting from January 2011 and continuing for the rest of the year, widespread discontent with the government and President Ali Abdullah Saleh, combined with the popularity of the wider Arab Spring movement culminated in the Yemeni Revolution.

[33][31] In a departure from their usual tactics up until then, AQAP, under the name of Ansar al-Sharia, launched an offensive to seize and administer territory in southern Yemen during the spring as army forces were moved out of the south and into Sana'a to quell the uprising.

[79][81][82] In late May 2011, amid fighting in Sana'a, more than three hundred Ansar al-Sharia fighters bolstered from their position in Jaʽār stormed Zinjibar, the capital of Abyan governorate, freeing dozens of prisoners and capturing the town.

[37] The Battle of Zinjibar would continue throughout the rest of the year, with the 25th Mechanized Brigade of the Yemeni army mostly holding defensive positions outside of the city as some 1,000 Ansar al-Sharia militants would attempt to dislodge them, nearly doing so in July 2011 until government airstrikes fended them off.

[33] AQAP wasn't a priority to the government or coalition, who regarded them as a "bulwark" and ally against the Houthis in the central and southern governorates, effectively placing them on the same side as pro-government forces operating in the regions.

[33] Group leadership and chain of command was severely crippled due to drone strikes, prompting AQAP to prioritize the maintenance of internal security to prevent spying and further targeted killings.

[90] An AQAP-produced documentary series titled "Demolishing Espionage" revealed that through an investigation the group had exposed a large Saudi intelligence infiltration within their ranks in mid-2018 and accusing them of causing the deaths of many leaders since 2015.

[77][132] Both bombs were composed similarly, having a cell phone timer that, once set off, would activate an light-emitting diode that would inject a syringe with an chemical igniter into the printer cartridge loaded with 11 to 14 ounces of PETN.

[152] The ban was justified by the government based on documents recovered by U.S. Special Forces during the Yakla raid, which detail AQAP plans to refine their ability to hide bombs inside of laptops and other devices.

[155] Through their propaganda messaging, AQAP has been able to exploit corruption, the lack of infrastructure and development allocated to tribal areas, as well as overstepping on part of the government and other groups in order to gain the allegiance of certain tribesmen.

[157][156][155] This strategy attracts unemployed and uneducated tribal youth within their operational strongholds who, as opposed to joining for ideological reasons, are mostly drawn into the group due to the promise of material benefits such as high salaries, new personal weapons and vehicles, and the assurance of assisting them with getting married and building a home.

[159] Tariq had reportedly permitted the establishment of AQAP training camps in Abyan in the 2000s, and actively took part in Ansar al-Sharia public ceremonies and mediation between the group and the Yemeni and Saudi governments for the release of imprisoned militants.

[52][55] Al-Malahem produces audio and video releases containing official statements, leadership speeches, claims for attacks, eulogies, reports on local activities and various serial productions such as ones focusing on martyrs or lessons on Islam.

AQAP's propaganda committee dictates the message that should be sent through a release, which is then delegated to al-Malahem staff to produce, publish, and disseminate throughout various sources including social media sites such as Telegram and Twitter as well as blogs, and Islamist forums and file-sharing websites.

[53][65][174] The magazine discussed topics such as corruption, poverty, inadequate service provision and inequities in natural resource allocation in order to appeal to locals and their issues, while also pertaining to global jihad.

[175][171] The newspaper, both distributed in hard copy across their territory and published online through Telegram, covered community worked conducted by AQAP, updates on the entire al-Qaeda network, as well as standard coverage of various world events such as the shooting of Alton Sterling and the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi.

[182][55] The magazine features guides and instructions on how to conduct lone wolf terrorist attacks in the West, as well as general AQAP propaganda and bylines from prominent al-Qaeda figures such as Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri.

"[182][184] Critics and viewers have noted its difference in tone and design to other AQAP media such as Sala al-Mahalem, with an approach more oriented towards youth in the United States and other Western nations through its modern look and use of colloquial English as well as pop culture references.

[184] Among his methods of output included a web blog, a Facebook page, booklets, CD's, audio recordings, online lectures, magazines and videos among others, which would then be spread across the internet, YouTube, and on Islamist forums.

[186][187][188] According to The New York Times, Awlaki utilized a combination of "scripture and vitriol", a captivating character and oration style, as well as an advanced knowledge and usage of the internet in order to promote violent extremism to Muslim youth in the West.

[188][189] Also commonly noted is his signature passive and soft demeanor, giving him a down-to-earth and relatable persona as opposed to more brutal and outwardly violent al-Qaeda figureheads such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

[54] Commentators have noted that Awlaki's killing had allowed him to achieve a "martyrdom" status among Islamists, with his media still receiving attention years after his death and numerous Islamic terrorists having been known to possess his propaganda, such as Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the perpetrators of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing.