Wedemeyer supported Chiang's struggle against Mao Zedong and in 1947 President Truman sent him back to China to render a report on what actions the United States should take.

[3] Between 1936 and 1938, Captain Wedemeyer was one of a handful of United States Army officers, including Herman F. Kramer, who attended the Kriegsakademie in Berlin.

[7] Notably, in 1941 he was the chief author of the "Victory Program", which advocated the defeat of Germany's Wehrmacht in Europe as the prime war objective for the United States.

Wedemeyer later recalled his initial dread over the assignment, as service in the China theater was considered a graveyard for American officials, both military and diplomatic.

[10] During his time in the CBI, Wedemeyer attempted to motivate the Nationalist Chinese government to take a more aggressive role against the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces in the war.

He was instrumental in expanding the Hump airlift operation with additional, more capable transport aircraft, and continued Stilwell's programs to train, equip, and modernize the National Revolutionary Army.

His efforts were not wholly successful, in part because of the ill will engendered by his predecessor, as well as continuing friction over the role of the Chinese Communist Party's People's Liberation Army.

Wedemyer was credited for his advice in helping the NRA to defeat the Japanese forces in the Battle of West Hunan, as well as retaking Guilin and Liuzhou.

On 7 December 1945, Wedemeyer with General Douglas MacArthur, and navy Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, the three top military officers in the Far East, recommended to the Pentagon that it transport six more Chinese Nationalist armies into North China and Manchuria.

On 10 July 1945, Wedemeyer had informed General Marshall: If Uncle Sugar, Russia, and Britain united strongly in their endeavor to bring about a coalition of these two political parties [the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party] in China by coercing both sides to make realistic concessions, serious post-war disturbance may be averted and timely effective military employment of all Chinese may be obtained against the Japanese.

In July 1947, President Harry S. Truman sent Wedemeyer to China and Korea to examine the "political, economic, psychological and military situations."

Chiang's armies were far better-equipped than their Communist adversaries (who had not yet received weapons and training from the Soviets in Manchuria), and pushing them back on all fronts, but ammunition, fuel, and spare parts were severely lacking.

Ammunition shortages were also causing Nationalist divisions to lose battles, and Chaing's troops were forced to scavenge abandoned American dumps because no deliveries had been made.

While Secretary of State George C. Marshall had hoped that Wedemeyer could convince Chiang Kai-shek to institute those military, economic, and political reforms that would create a Nationalist-Communist coalition, he supported Truman's view and suppressed publication of Wedemeyer's report, further provoking resentment by Nationalist and communist advocates both inside and outside the US government and the armed forces.

Following completion of the report, he assumed command of the Sixth United States Army in San Francisco, California; in this capacity, Wedemeyer "thought of himself as cut off from further military policy making.

In 1951, after the outbreak of the Korean War, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy said that Wedemeyer had prepared a wise plan that would keep China a valued ally, which it had been sabotaged: "only in treason can we find why evil genius thwarted and frustrated it."