The agreement was eventually terminated by the Malian government on January 25, 2024, amid open conflict with the CMA that sprung from the withdrawal of MINUSMA peacekeepers and presence of Wagner Group forces.
A military coup in Bamako and the rise of armed Tuareg groups, such as the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and jihadist elements, destabilised the region further.
By 2013, the Malian government, supported by French forces under Operation Serval, as well as troops from Chad and other African nations, managed to recapture much of the north from jihadist control.
However, the MNLA had taken advantage of the power vacuum left by retreating jihadists to regain control over key cities in northern Mali, particularly Kidal, a strategic town in the region of Azawad.
While initially refusing to allow elections in Kidal, the MNLA eventually agreed to permit them in July 2013, provided that United Nations troops secured the voting process across Azawad.
[2] To prevent further violence and enable peaceful elections, mediation efforts led by Burkina Faso's President Blaise Compaoré began on June 6, 2013.
The signatories included the Malian government, represented by the Minister of Territorial Administration, Colonel Moussa Sinko Coulibaly, and the leadership of the MNLA and the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA).
The Malian government, led by President Keïta, resisted discussions on granting autonomy to the Tuareg-majority regions, contributing to a growing sense of frustration among northern factions.
[3] By September 2013, the MNLA accused the Malian government of failing to honour its commitments under the Ouagadougou Accords, particularly regarding the cantoning of rebel fighters and the release of prisoners.
The lack of a clear path to resolving the autonomy question and the continuing incidents of violence laid the groundwork for the subsequent resurgence of conflict in 2014, culminating in the escalation of hostilities during the Kidal crisis in May 2014.
[4][5] Negotiations restarted in Kidal at the behest of the Malian government on May 22, and were mediated by Mauritanian and AU president Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz.
[6][7] On February 19, 2015, representatives from the Malian government and the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) agreed upon a new document, including the cessation of hostilities, as negotiations to end the broader war continued in Algiers.
The CMA asked for some time to consider the agreement, as there were no propositions for autonomy or federalism for northern Mali, which angered a large portion of Tuareg rebels.
[18] The Carter Center, who was appointed as the independent observer of the agreement's implementations in 2017, stated that 22% of the accords' provisions were put into effect by 2017, and by 2020, that number had only increased to 23%.
Northern Mali, despite the peace deal, remained volatile due to a combination of inter-ethnic tensions and the rise of jihadist groups, including the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and affiliates of al-Qaeda.
[20] The incomplete implementation of the accords, particularly the failure to effectively decentralise power and integrate former rebels into the national army, created a vacuum in governance.
[19] The Sahel's security situation worsened as international forces, including the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), were stretched thin.