American services and supply in the Siegfried Line campaign

A critical shortage of winter clothing developed from a reluctance to accept new items and a failure to order adequate quantities in the mistaken belief that the war would end before they were required.

[14] Logistical difficulties, in particular shortages of food, fuel, ammunition and spare parts, were indeed critical and constituted a drag on operations, but they were not the only factors that brought the Allied advance to a halt.

American forces were widely dispersed and, with the logistical situation preying on his mind, a cautious Hodges ordered his corps commanders to halt when they encountered strong resistance.

[20] By February 1945, 8,400 American and 700 British soldiers were arriving in Paris each day on 72-hour passes, but there were 21,000 troops stationed within 15 miles (24 km) of the city center, and another 140,000 in the Seine Department.

The jacket was hard to keep presentable in the UK where dry cleaning facilities were scarce, and pink trousers tended to show dirt, so many officers wore the dark olive drab ones instead.

It retained the more complicated features, making it hard to mass-produce, and Clay did not believe that more than 2.6 million could be delivered by the end of 1944, and offered Littlejohn 479,000 M1941 jackets as substitutes.

The first troops he encountered wearing it were part of a Women's Army Corps unit that arrived in early 1944, and he was appalled to hear them refer to it as a "maternity jacket".

[34] When the pursuit ended in early September, it was apparent that the troops had lost or discarded more equipment than had been worn out or destroyed in action, but large-scale salvage efforts were only just beginning, and their outcome could not be predicted.

He also wanted 6,000 long tons (6,100 t) for the troops in forward areas to be flown in by air, but the Assistant Chief of Staff (G-4) at COMZ, Brigadier General James H. Stratton, was unwilling to alter existing priorities laid down by the 12th Army Group, which gave precedence to fuel and ammunition, and Bradley supported him in this.

[40][41] Bradley accepted blame for his part in the situation that developed, later explaining that:[43]When the rains first came in November with a blast of wintry cold, our troops were ill-prepared for winter-time campaigning.

This was traceable in part to the September crisis in supply for, during our race to the Rhine, I had deliberately by-passed shipments of winter clothing in favor of ammunition and gasoline.

Three DUKW companies moving up from Normandy on 16 September to support a crossing of the Rhine were dispatched loaded with 300,000 sets of warm undergarments for the First Army.

Seventh Army, which was supported by the Southern Line of Communications (SOLOC) instead of COMZ, and drew its supplies from NATOUSA, received winter clothing by air on 26 September.

Littlejohn struck a deal with Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz, the commander of the United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe for bombers to deliver 41 percent of the winter clothing required by the First and Third Armies to forward airstrips.

The infantry divisions were given priority for receiving winter clothing, and a full issue was made in the First and Third Armies in early October, although there were some shortages of overshoes, raincoats and leggings that took until the end of the month to remedy.

Their cut was such that they put pressure on the upper part of the foot, especially when heavy or extra socks were worn, and even when correctly fitted had to be laced up tightly, restricting blood circulation.

[33] When it became clear the combat boot was not adequate for the conditions, Littlejohn placed an order on 8 December for another 500,000 pairs of shoepacs in addition to the 446,000 already shipped and those issued to the Seventh Army.

A lesser but significant number also arrived from the Third Army at the Gare de l'Est, and in January it also started to receive patients from SOLOC when the hospitals there became overloaded by the German Nordwind offensive.

[73] On 11 October 1944, the 12th Army Group announced a credit system, which became operative once sufficient stocks were built up in the ammunition depots around Liege, Soissons and Verdun.

[80] Maximum accuracy required that the ballistic properties of the ammunition be absolutely identical, but this was difficult to achieve under wartime mass-production conditions with the technology of the time.

[82][83] The United States was not as fully mobilized as its Allies or opponents, and American production, while great, was not outstanding, considering its large population, well-developed pre-war industrial and technological base, and access to raw materials.

On that assumption, medium and heavy artillery pieces and their ammunition were given a low priority for production, and were repeatedly cut back in the Army Supply Program, thereby saving steel and shipping space.

To provide more skilled machinists, tool makers and machine operators, the commander of ASF, General Brehon B. Somervell, released servicemen to work in foundries, and furloughed up to 2,500 men for ninety days at a time to help manufacture 105 mm artillery ammunition.

[102] Keeping the components of the A and B rations "balanced", that is, in the correct proportions so the cooks could follow the Army menus and avoid having to serve the same meals too often, was a frustrating task.

When the first commodity-loaded reefer ships arrived from the US carrying perishables earmarked for American troops on the continent, they were unloaded in the UK and transferred to refrigerated coasters for the trip to France.

The number of meat meals served in the Communications Zone was cut back from twelve to seven per week in October to allow for turkey to be provided to the troops for Thanksgiving.

The commitment to provide a turkey dinner had been made before the implications of the rapid advance in September had been fully understood, but it was felt that the effect on morale would be severe if the Army reneged on the promise.

The first bulk fuel was discharged at Le Havre on 31 October, but the pipeline was not operational until December, and decanting and loading facilities at the three ports were not completed until January 1945.

[117]Coal was required for many military purposes, mainly for coal-burning locomotives, but also for heating hospitals and barracks, cooking, roasting coffee, and providing hot water for baths and laundries.

[131] After the war an ETO board chaired by Lord concluded that many of the problems encountered during the Siegfried Line campaign in October and November could have been anticipated, and time was lost as increasingly higher echelons responded and developed solutions.