American transportation in the Siegfried Line campaign

In August 1944, the Supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, elected to continue the pursuit of the retreating German forces beyond the Seine instead of pausing to build up supplies and establish the lines of communication as called for in the original Operation Overlord plan.

The Germans attempted to delay the Allied advance until the onset of bad weather by denying access to ports and demolishing communications infrastructure in order to give their own forces time to recover.

In September, Cherbourg was the only deep-water port in northwest Europe in Allied hands capable of handling Liberty ships, but it had been badly damaged, and took a long time to restore.

[5] This brought not just the 12th and 21st Army Groups under Eisenhower's direct command, but also Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee's Communications Zone (COMZ), which became operational on the continent on 7 August.

The hope was that these measures would restrict the Allies' operational capabilities, which relied heavily on logistical support, and thereby gain sufficient time to reconstitute the German forces.

If six to eight weeks could be gained, then bad autumn weather would set in, further restricting the Allies' mobility, air operations and logistical support, and the German forces might be able to take the offensive again.

[24] Under the Operation Overlord plan US forces would be supported over the Omaha and Utah landing beaches, an artificial Mulberry harbor, and the ports of Cherbourg in Normandy and Saint-Malo and Quiberon Bay in Brittany.

As it turned out, only minor cuts had to be made because several MT and store ships were released from cross-Channel traffic in August in time to reach ports in the US and sail for Europe again in September.

He had recently called forward nineteen ships loaded with engineering supplies in order to obtain an average of 150 long tons (150 t) of urgently needed equipment from each vessel.

The Chief of ASF, Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, informed Lee that he could expect no more commodity-loaded ships with rations, vehicles or ammunition until he made headway with reducing the backlogs.

[47] Conway enlisted Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's chief advisor, in putting the WSA's case to the president: that it could not ask the British "to bear the brunt of our failure to utilize our ships properly.

"[48] Roosevelt instructed the WSA to negotiate a cut in the UK Import Program for December 1944, January 1945 and February 1945 with the British, asked the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion to investigate the labor situation at the shipyards, and told the JCS to get the theaters to break up the pools of idle shipping and improve turnaround times.

Saint-Brieuc was opened in mid-September but discharges averaged only 317 long tons (322 t) per day, mostly coal for local railways and power stations,[56] and it was handed over to the French on 9 November.

[58] Between them, they had anchorages for up to six Liberty ships, which were discharged using Army lighters, Navy landing craft and civilian boats, and handled an average of 2,105 long tons (2,139 t) per day until they were closed on 14 December.

The British train ferry HMS Twickenham arrived with its first load of diesel electric locomotives and rolling stock on 29 July, but the Jetée du Homet was not yet ready to receive them, and they had to be unloaded with cranes.

SHAEF was dissatisfied with how the port was being run, and on 30 October Wyman was relieved of command of the Normandy Base Section and replaced by Major General Lucius D. Clay, on loan from ASF.

On 26 November Colonel Eugene M. Caffey assumed temporary command of the Normandy Base Section until Major General Henry S. Aurand arrived on 17 December.

Chronic shortages of spare parts forced a resort to cannibalizing inoperable vehicles, and improvisations such as making propeller shaft strut bearings from applewood and replacement rudders from scrap metal.

The Germans had demolished the cargo handling facilities and blocked the river channel with toppled cranes and sunken boats and barges, but 14,000 feet (4,300 m) of the quays were still in good condition.

[31] However, the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay,[86] noted on 3 September that the entrances to Antwerp and Rotterdam could be blocked and mined, and it could not be predicted how long it would take to open them.

Tentative agreements were reached on the allocation of tonnage capacity, storage facilities and railway lines, and arrangements were made for the command and control of the port and its installations, and regarding responsibility for rehabilitation works.

[103] In January, new depots were opened in the Lille area, and supplies began moving again, but the number of railway cars reporting each day was consistently below what was required to clear the backlog.

Most of the activity involved short hauls,[106] but during the pursuit from the Seine to the German border in August and early September, the distance between the armies and the ports and beaches stretched to over 400 miles (640 km), and most of the long haulage had to be carried out by motor transport.

The Green Diamond was organized by the Normandy Base Section and delivered 15,600 long tons (15,900 t) of supplies from Cherbourg to railway transfer points at Granville and Dol between 10 October and 1 November.

Meanwhile, since inspections had shown that 40 percent of tire losses were due to preventable causes such as underinflation and overloading, the theater launched a media campaign in the Stars and Stripes newspaper and on the Armed Forces Network radio.

To the northeast, the Germans had not had sufficient time to carry out widespread demolitions, and the network was largely intact, although some of the double-track lines had single-track sections, and only one bridge in the Liège area was still standing, resulting in a bottleneck that was not rectified until January 1945.

46 Group RAF, and converted Consolidated B-24 Liberator bombers managed to deliver 1,000 long tons (1,000 t) per day to airfields at Saint-Dizier, Clastres and Florennes that were made available by the Ninth Air Force.

[124] In December, isolated units of the 106th Infantry Division called for air supply, and 150 aircraft were readied, but the mission was not flown due to bad weather around their bases in the UK.

An attempt to resupply cut off elements of the 3rd Armored Division was less successful; errors in map reading resulted in 23 of the 29 aircraft dispatched dropping their supplies behind enemy lines, and the rest were either diverted or shot down.

American forces were widely dispersed and, with the logistical situation preying on his mind, a cautious Hodges ordered his corps commanders to halt when they encountered strong resistance.