This distinction provides for the large class of mental acts in which we are simply aware of, or "take in" a number of familiar objects, about which we in general make no judgment, unless our attention is suddenly called by a new feature.
[1] Similarly, G.F. Stout stated that while we have a very vivid idea of a character or an incident in a work of fiction, we can hardly be said in any real sense to have any belief or to make any judgment as to its existence or truth.
With this mental state may be compared the purely aesthetic contemplation of music, wherein apart from, say, a false note, the faculty of judgment is for the time inoperative.
Professor Stout further investigates the phenomena of apprehension, and comes to the conclusion that "it is possible to distinguish and identify a whole without apprehending any of its constituent details."
On the other hand, if the attention focuses itself for a time on the apprehended object, there is an expectation that such details will, as it were, emerge into consciousness.