Falklands War order of battle: Argentine air forces
The FAA had only two tanker aircraft to serve the entirety of the air force and navy, and its fighter-bomber Mirage IIIs and IAI Daggers were not equipped for aerial refuelling.
The FAA's training, tactics and equipment were focused on a possible war against Chile, resulting from disputes such as the Beagle conflict.
[12] The small air arm of the Argentine Navy (Armada Republica Argentina; ARA) was in the middle of the transition from the A-4Q Skyhawk to the new Super Etendard.
Only five of the Etendard's anti-ship Exocet missiles had been delivered at the time of the conflict, at which point an arms embargo prevented the delivery of further shipments.
France, being an ally of the United Kingdom, recalled all technicians, which left Argentine scientists and electronic engineers to figure out a way to make the missiles take input from the plane's computers.
Air Force pilots trained during April against the two Argentine Type 42 destroyers, similar to those of the British Fleet, and according to the Naval officers all the sorties were shot down, causing great concern to the High Command until the successful May 1 strikes which proved that aircraft could survive.
By the end of the conflict, the British forces had come to admire the FAA's spirited conduct in the face of an effective air defence network.
"[15] The British Operational Research Branch Report declassified and released to the public in February 2013 states: The Argentine air arms conducted a 10 week campaign during which time they carried out air supply of their forces in the Falkland Islands, reconnaissance of UK forces in the South Atlantic, and engaged units of TF317.
The 4 air arms (ndlr: FAA, COAN, CAE, PNA ) were, within their own spheres, generally capable and well organised, though limited in AAR and reconnaissance assets.
Amid fears about British/Chilean air strikes and/or SAS raids, Argentine aircraft were dispersed in the surrounding areas of their southern airfields, e.g., several parts of the national route #3 were used for this purpose.
Due to the distance required to fly to the islands, two minutes was the average time Argentine attack aircraft had available in the target area.
