The Army of Northern Virginia was the primary military force of the Confederate States of America in the Eastern Theater of the American Civil War.

When the Peninsula Campaign began, Johnston took his army down to the Richmond environs where it was merged with several smaller Confederate commands, including a division led by D.H. Hill as well as Benjamin Huger's Department of Norfolk, John Magruder's Army of the Peninsula, and miscellaneous brigades and regiments pulled from various Southern states.

At Seven Pines, Longstreet and Smith served as temporary wing commanders, and operational control of their divisions went to Brig.

Maj. Gen. Gustavus Woodson Smith commanded the Army of Northern Virginia on May 31, 1862, following the wounding of Gen. J. E. Johnston during the Battle of Seven Pines.

With Smith seemingly having a nervous breakdown, President Jefferson Davis drafted orders to place Gen. Robert E. Lee in command the following day.

On June 1, 1862, General Robert E. Lee, its final and best known leader historically, took command after Johnston was wounded and Smith suffered what may have been a nervous breakdown at the Battle of Seven Pines.

The cavalry corps was then temporarily split into divisions, but was merged again on August 11, 1864, under command of Lt. Gen. Wade Hampton III.

He removed several generals who had turned in a less-than-inspiring performance in the Seven Days Battles, including John Magruder and Benjamin Huger.

D.H. Hill's and McLaws's divisions were left behind in the Richmond area and did not participate in the Northern Virginia campaign.

During the Fredericksburg Campaign, Longstreet had the divisions of Anderson, Hood, McLaws, Ransom, and George Pickett, who had just returned to action after months of convalescence from a wound sustained at the Battle of Gaines's Mill.

Hill got the divisions of Harry Heth, William D. Pender, and Richard Anderson; and Richard Ewell (returning to action after almost a year of recovering from the loss of a leg at Second Bull Run) got the divisions of Robert Rodes, Jubal Early, and Edward "Allegheny" Johnson.

After taking over command in mid-1862, Lee began preparing to lead the Army of Northern Virginia for the first time.

After the costly victories during the Seven Days Battles and at Second Manassas in August 1862, Lee had now lost a total of 30,000 of his approximately 92,000 troops within three months of becoming the Confederate's top general.

Lee then planned to take his troops north into Maryland to destroy a critical railroad bridge across the Susquehanna River at Harrisburg in a letter written to President Davis.

Against the advice from General Longstreet and Jackson, Lee split his troops into four parts to attack the Union from different fronts.

Clearly outnumbered and opposed to Lee's plan, Longstreet stated, "General, I wish we could stand still and let the damned Yankees come to us!

Hill's troops and the mixture of McClellan's and Burnside's sluggishness, saved Lee's Army of Northern Virginia and allowed them to barely hold off the Union in Maryland.

Also the Defense District of North Carolina answered directly to the Army as well as the Reserve Artillery with six battalions and the cavalry with six regiments.

He introduced a corps-like structure of command, and as an intermediate army management he named the left and right wing.

Major General Hill's Division also remained in the eastern parts of Richmond with the order to bind McClellan's attention as long as possible.

[17] As it became predictable that the Army of the Potomac would soon be transferred to support Pope, Lee ordered the Division north.

While fundamental changes in the Army's command structure were not necessary, General Lee exchanged divisions and brigades or added additional strength to some.

General Lee had already considered before the Battle of Antietam to slim down the overall structure, but intended there be no changes in leadership.

Lee made demands that all regiments had to be consolidated solely with recruits originating from their corresponding home states.

Not figuring into this overall number is the fact that Lee had made the decision to station a whole division and a single cavalry brigade at Shenandoah Valley for protection at this time and these troops are missing from the total estimates.

Thereout arose a new problem: Because of the necessity to always show its presence to the enemy there were only limited supplies available for the army from the surrounding villages and towns.

This left Lee with few options and therefore he gave the special order on December 24, 1862, to move half of his artillery into the hinterlands to have his horses better supplied.

[23] The Confederate War Department strongly suggested in position papers to Lee dating from the February 18th, 1862 to station two divisions at the Atlantic coast.

In the course of the Richmond-Petersburg Campaign the number of soldiers temporarily grew to 82,633 while parts of the Army were under the command by Lieutenant General Early in Shenandoah Valley.

One day later he thanked his men and his officers for their bravery and sturdiness and announced the dismissal of all troops on their word of honor in General Order No.