He had a distinguished career, however, his place in history has largely been unacknowledged due to his dismissal by General Sir Thomas Blamey, at the very point when Potts had fought the Japanese to exhaustion.

In August, Potts, who by this time had been promoted to lieutenant and given command of the 4th Light Trench Mortar Battery,[8] was awarded the Military Cross for gallantry during the Battle of Mouquet Farm.

[10]Later in the war, having been promoted to captain,[11] Potts was able to transfer back to the 16th Battalion and on 6 July 1918, near Hamel, he received a serious gunshot wound in the chest, which he barely survived.

In April 1940, Potts requested a transfer to this force and although still suffering from the effects of the wounds he had received in 1918 he was passed medically fit and granted the rank of major.

He played a key role in staffing the battalion and getting it ready for action in Syria in 1941, where he was awarded the Distinguished Service Order for inspiring leadership at the Battle of the Litani River on 9 and 10 June.

Potts took his troops up into the Blackall Range, where the thick scrub and steep grades gave these experienced desert fighters an idea of what lay ahead for them.

General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of South West Pacific Area, was at this time planning a landing on Japanese-held Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands.

[22] Potts flew into Port Moresby on 8 August and set up a staging post at Koitaki, close to the start of the trail at Owers Corner.

The Japanese held elevated positions on either side of the main trail, and were able to hammer Maroubra Force with mortar and machine gun fire.

[27] On 3 September Potts had received orders from his superior in Port Morseby, Major General Arthur "Tubby" Allen, to hold Myola and gather for an offensive.

[32] Next morning Potts signalled Allen; "Will not give ground if you guarantee my line of communication ... full of fight, but physically below par, mainly feet and dysentery ... Respectfully consider offensive ops require more than one Bde [brigade] task."

Menari was extremely exposed to observation from further up the trail, and the village was already under barrage from Japanese artillery and light machine guns by the time the first 2/16th troops arrived.

[38] During the Battle of Brigade Hill an Intelligence officer, Captain Geoff Lyon arrived from Port Moresby, sent by Allen to give him an on-the-ground assessment.

Soon after, war correspondent Chester Wilmot, who had also been over the Owen Stanley Ranges on foot and seen the fighting, was able to corroborate Potts' account in a meeting with Rowell.

[42] Japanese war correspondent Seizo Okada reported that after receiving the order to return to Buna, "for a time the soldiers remained stupefied among the rocks on the mountain side.

According to Murdoch, Potts, fresh from Allen's glowing endorsement, began by extolling the virtues of his men, and expressed satisfaction with the boost to home front morale they had been able to provide.

[47] Murdoch says that the news spread rapidly, and as Staff Captain he was inundated with resignation papers from officers wishing to show solidarity with Potts.

Years later he told official historian Dudley McCarthy that: "We knew the terrain was most difficult and the Japs very good jungle fighters ... we had a war to win and it was our job to call in the best man we could.

This is the tack taken by Dudley McCarthy in the official war history; "Blamey and Herring, who did not at that time understand so well the circumstances in which Potts found himself and the way he had acquitted himself, genuinely misjudged him".

MacArthur maintained in a letter to the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, General George Marshall, on 6 September that "the Australians have proven themselves unable to match the enemy in jungle fighting.

Some have alleged that 21st Brigade's next combat role in the battle for Gona saw excessive casualties, due to the burning desire to erase Blamey's slur.

"By the time the battle for Gona had concluded, the Blamey slur at Koitaki had manifested itself in the interference in the command structure, and the resultant slaughter of soldiers.

Potts was much happier with his battalion commanding officers, but was able to write to Dawn; "I put over a pretty brutal talk to COs ... on matters of jealousies, viewpoints and lack of teamwork.

The brigade passed the time enjoying the facilities that the American garrison troops had left behind, when they were transferred to more glamorous work re-conquering the Philippines.

"To fight a war here and provoke hostilities will be nothing more than sinful destruction and wastage of bloody fine men who deserve to be laid off and sent home to their people".

[75] In Potts' view, taking a brigade trained to the peak of fitness and primed to attack and then giving them a garrison job, was actually more hazardous than sending them into battle.

[81] Potts recorded in his report that enemy morale was good, however "Food captured in the field kitchens consisted mainly of bamboo shoots, roots and vegetable matter generally.

[84] Emperor Hirohito formally announced the end of hostilities in Tokyo on 15 August, but his loyal troops in the Solomons did not hear the news for some time.

II Corps HQ at Torokina advised Australian commanders that it may take 8 days for the information to reach Japanese troops in Bougainville.

[1] Following the war, Potts returned to farming in Western Australia and briefly attempted to pursue a career in politics, standing unsuccessfully in 1949 as a Country Party candidate for the federal seat of Forrest in the House of Representatives.