Article 14 of the Constitution of Singapore

In a 2005 judgment, the High Court expressed the view that the phrase necessary or expedient confers upon Parliament "an extremely wide discretionary power and remit that permits a multifarious and multifaceted approach towards achieving any of the purposes specified in Art 14(2) of the Constitution".

No necessity or expedience requirement applies to the second type of grounds, which appear in Articles 14(2)(a) (restrictions "designed to protect the privileges of Parliament or to provide against contempt of court, defamation or incitement to any offence") and 14(3) (laws relating to labour or education).

Judicial and statutory limits have been read into the Article, a process which is deemed necessary because the rights to free speech, assembly and association do not exist in a vacuum but jostle with competing interests and counter-values.

[11] In fact, citizens were urged by Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong not to be "passive bystanders in their own fate" but to debate issues "with reason, passion and conviction".

However, despite the broad power that Article 19(3) accords to the Indian courts, they have been "most reluctant" to invalidate legislation purportedly infringing the rights to free speech or assembly.

The High Court concluded: "Needless to say, the notion of proportionality has never been part of the common law in relation to the judicial review of the exercise of a legislative and/or an administrative power or discretion.

In doing so, the Government must merely satisfy the court that there is a factual basis on which Parliament has considered it "necessary or expedient" to restrict one's individual right to freedom of speech, assembly or association.

In Chee Siok Chin, which dealt with the constitutionality of sections 13A and 13B of the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act[38] the High Court approved the following quotation from V.N.

It signifies absence of disorder involving breaches of local significance in contradistinction to national upheavals such as revolution, civil strife or war, affecting the security of the State.

In Chan Hiang Leng Colin v. Public Prosecutor (1994),[40] Chief Justice Yong Pung How considered the term in relation to the right to freedom of religion embodied in Article 15(4) of the Constitution[41] and stated:[42] I am of the view that religious beliefs ought to have proper protection, but actions undertaken or flowing from such beliefs must conform with the general law relating to public order and social protection.

[43] The sovereignty, integrity and unity of Singapore are undoubtedly the paramount mandate of the Constitution and anything, including religious beliefs and practices, which tend to run counter to these objectives must be restrained.In Chee Siok Chin it was further clarified that "the legislative power to circumscribe the rights conferred by Art 14 of the Constitution is, inter alia, delineated by what is 'in the interest of public order' and not confined to 'the maintenance of public order'.

For instance, the Broadcasting (Class Licence) Notification,[46] made under section 9 of the Broadcasting Act, makes it mandatory for an Internet content provider to register with the Media Development Authority (MDA) if it is, or if the Authority thinks that it is, an individual providing any programme about or a body of persons engaged in the "propagation, promotion or discussion of political or religious issues relating to Singapore, on the World Wide Web through the Internet".

In any case, even if the latter argument was accepted, it might be said that the right of Singapore citizens to receive information by reading the Asian Wall Street Journal had not been impaired since 400 copies of it were still in circulation.

[72] On 14 January 1972, the Singapore Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses was dissolved,[73] the Minister stating that the existence of the society was prejudicial to public welfare and good order because its members refused to do National Service,[74] which is generally compulsory for male citizens and second-generation permanent residents.

An attempt in Chan Hiang Leng Colin[40] to challenge the ban on the grounds of freedom of religion protected by Article 15(1) of the Constitution proved unsuccessful.

Unique to Article 14(2)(a) is an addendum stating that the right to freedom of speech and expression may be curtailed by restrictions designed to protect the privileges of Parliament, or to provide against contempt of court, defamation or incitement to any offence.

[98] Moreover, an act or statement would have such an inherent tendency if it conveyed to an average reasonable reader or viewer allegations of bias, lack of impartiality, impropriety or any wrongdoing concerning a judge (and a fortiori, a court) in the exercise of his judicial function.

He expressed the view that if it was purely a question of semantics, it would be preferable for the court to adopt the real risk test as it precisely conveys to laymen and lawyers what the law is concerned with.

"[104] He noted that the respondent's counsel had not argued that the offence is inherently unconstitutional, and that a majority of cases had concluded that the real risk test, coupled with a right of fair criticism, is a reasonable limitation on free speech.

The legal burden, on the other hand, would be on the Respondent to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the impugned statement does not constitute fair criticism, and that it presents a real risk of undermining public confidence in the administration of justice.

She also noted that English authorities impose another limit on the content of criticism – that the acts or words in question must neither impute improper motives to nor impugn the integrity, propriety and impartiality of judges or the courts.

As such, the courts must take Article 162 of the Constitution into consideration when deciding whether the common law tort of defamation offends the fundamental liberty of freedom of speech and expression.

In Jeyaratnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew (1992),[124] Justice L.P. Thean, when delivering the judgment of the court, held that "[p]ersons holding public office or politicians ... are equally entitled to have their reputations protected as those of any other persons".

[128] In Lingens, the European Court of Human Rights was of the opinion that a politician "inevitably and knowingly lays himself open to close scrutiny of his every word and deed by both journalists and the public at large, and he must consequently display a greater degree of tolerance".

Thean J. said: "Such criticisms or attacks must, in our opinion, respect the bounds set by the law of defamation, and we do not accept that the publication of false and defamatory allegations, even in the absence of actual malice on the part of the publisher, should be allowed to pass with impunity.

[132] The current interpretation of the law gives the legislature an unfettered discretion in limiting freedom of speech in Singapore through the enactment and amendment of relevant legislation.

Hor opines that:[133] What is instructive and applicable in Singapore is the realisation that it is the constitutional responsibility of the judiciary to ensure that the basic commitment to the freedom of speech is not undermined by giving the Legislature carte blanche to derogate therefrom in either some or all of the specified exceptions.

Although there is nothing in Art 14(2)(a) of the Singapore Constitution and the Defamation Act which precludes our courts from developing the common law of defamation for the common convenience and welfare of society in keeping with Singapore's prevailing political, social and cultural values (save for those provisions in these two statutes which impose such a restriction), Art 14(2)(a) also expressly provides that it is Parliament which has the final say on how the balance between constitutional free speech and protection of reputation should be struck.Secondly, when striking a balance between freedom of expression and the protection of reputation, the court will need to make a value judgment that is dependent on local political and social conditions.

[141] The Chief Justice also suggested that the rationale in the Reynolds case might be given effect by continuing to find the defendant liable for defamation but reducing the amount of damages payable depending on how much care he or she took to ensure the accuracy of the information published.

He noted: "There is no reason why a defendant who has published a defamatory statement should be allowed to get off scot-free for injuring the plaintiff's reputation simply because he has satisfied the 'responsible journalism' test.