Presidential Council for Minority Rights

The Presidential Council for Minority Rights (PCMR) is a non-elected government body in Singapore established in 1970, the main function of which is to scrutinize most of the bills passed by Parliament to ensure that they do not discriminate against any racial or religious community.

One member of the PCMR is nominated by the chairman to the Presidential Elections Committee, which is empowered to ensure that candidates for the office of President have the qualifications required by the Constitution.

Another criticism of the PCMR's composition is that having judges on the Council may lead to a conflict of interest as they may have to exercise judicial review over Acts of Parliament they have either endorsed or rejected previously.

[1] Its general function, as articulated in the Constitution, is "to consider and report on such matters affecting persons of any racial or religious community in Singapore as may be referred to the Council by Parliament or the Government".

[2] To fulfil its role as a safeguard against any parliamentary or executive propensity to majoritarian or sectarian politics, it may constrict the Government's freedom to discriminate against racial and religious communities by obstructing the passage of new laws and regulations that it deems to contain such "differentiating measures".

[6] Nevertheless, it forms part of the statutory framework for the People's Action Party government's internationally lauded efforts in managing minority issues in multiethnic Singapore.

[9] Singapore had just been ejected from Malaysia, and had experienced an extended period of racial and religious tension resulting from the Maria Hertogh riots.

[23] Even if the new Council's powers were strictly limited to giving advice, this was justified on the basis that it would nevertheless serve to alert the public should the Government proceed to enact an Act which prejudices a class of minorities.

[24] Indeed, the Constitutional Commission had intended for the Council of State "to fix the attention of the public on any matter originating from Parliament which may adversely affect the interests of any minority group".

It has been suggested that this causes the PCMR's composition to be "somewhat weighted in favour of the Government and to that extent derogates from the concept of an uncommitted council of elders which sits as a watchdog over the rights of individuals".

[36] Apart from these qualifications stated in the Constitution, there was an indication in the Parliamentary debates leading to the PCMR's introduction that permanent members of the PCMR are very likely to be drawn from "men of distinction" who hold or have held high public appointments, such as former prime ministers, the Chief Justice, former chief justices, judges, the Speaker of the Parliament of Singapore, the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, the Attorney-General and former permanent secretaries.

[28] A member may be disqualified if he is found to be of unsound mind, if he becomes insolvent or is an undischarged bankrupt, if he is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment of not less than one year or a fine of not less than S$2,000, or if he has lost his Singaporean citizenship or declared himself allied to a foreign country.

[54] The counterpoint is that it is precisely those in power who are best placed to scrutinize bills for illegitimate differentiating measures, because "it is often those with political affiliations who can make the biggest contribution to the discussion; if nothing else, from the folly and error of their past ways".

There is a possibility of conflict of interest for judges who sit as members of the Council if they find themselves having to review the very Acts of Parliament that they have either endorsed or rejected previously.

There may be confusion as regards the legality of a piece of legislation if, for example, it was initially condemned by the council but enacted by the Government and later endorsed by the courts upon judicial review.

[56] When the potential conflict between the Chief Justice's role as head of the judiciary and as chairman of the council was raised in 2010 by Githu Muigai, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Tolerance, he was informed that the Chief Justice would recuse himself from any matter in which a conflict arose.

[57] On the other hand, it has been suggested that the enactment of a statute by Parliament in the face of an adverse report by the PCMR should be taken as a "mere disagreement over the interpretation of the Constitution and thus should not foreclose judicial review".

Even though the PCMR can potentially prevent an unconstitutional piece of legislation from coming into force, there is doubt as to whether the council's members have sufficient legal training to undertake the burdensome task.

[3] All proceedings are conducted in private, and the council is prohibited from hearing objectors or examining witnesses regarding any bill or law under consideration.

[64] Under the Constitutional Commission's original proposal, the PCMR was meant to hold its meetings publicly in Parliament, and publish reports of such proceedings.

Barker, the Minister for Law and National Development, commented in Parliament that having the discussions in private helps to ensure that they are conducted frankly and constructively, and not held with an eye on the press or with a view to scoring political points.

Secret discussions also prevent the public from being informed about controversial issues that may have arisen in the course of implementing new laws, especially those which may affect the rights of minorities.

[75] Alternatively, Parliament may effectively ignore the council's adverse report with a motion passed with an affirmative vote of two-thirds of its members.

[81] Moreover, grounds upon which bills may be excluded such as "public safety" and "peace", have been described as "nebulous" with potentially wide definitions that are open to abuse by the government in power.

As with bills, tardiness in sending an adverse report results in a conclusive presumption that the Council finds no differentiating measures in the subsidiary legislation.

[87] The Council may also make a report on any written law in force on 9 January 1970, but there is no constitutional provision that requires Parliament or the relevant Minister to act on it.

In 1954, a constitutional commission headed by Sir George William Rendel rejected a proposal for a second chamber composed solely of minority representatives, citing its unsuitability in a tiny state like Singapore and arguing that it might end up being unnecessarily bureaucratic.

On those occasions where the Council might have rightly drawn attention to differentiating measures in proposed Bills, the legislature has pre-empted this by inserting "notwithstanding clauses" in the Constitution.

[97] An alternative view is that it is not the formal structure of the council – which in theory is capable of exercising judicial, legislative and review functions – but the presence of a practically single-party Parliament that drastically undermines the PCMR's powers, restricting it solely to an advisory capacity.