Assessment of the Battle of Long Tan

[3] Furthermore, the local D445 Battalion was redeployed northwards against the newly deployed 11th Armored Cavalry Taskforce a month later and so the true significance of the battle is called into question.

Finally, it was possible no ambush was planned at all, and that the Viet Cong had been moving on Nui Dat in regimental strength when they unexpectedly ran into D Company, resulting in an encounter battle.

Later interviews conducted by an Australian veteran of the battle Terry Burstall, with commanders of the 275th Battalion and D445 Battalion including the battle commander and later Deputy Defense Minister Nguyen Thoi Bung indicate that mortaring was intended to draw out the 6 RAR out of their base, in which an ambush was to occur followed by a retreat before artillery and air support can be utilised, typical of the grab-by-the-belt tactic.

For several weeks Australian signals intelligence (SIGINT) had tracked a radio transmitter moving westwards to a position just north of Long Tan; however, extensive patrolling failed to find the unit.

At 02:43 on the night of 16/17 August, Viet Cong mortars, recoilless rifles (RCLs) and artillery heavily bombarded Nui Dat from a position 2,000 metres (2,200 yd) to the east, before being engaged by counter-battery fire.

Beginning as an encounter battle, heavy fighting ensued as the advancing battalions of the Viet Cong 275th Regiment attempted to encircle and destroy the Australians.

Fighting off an attack on their right before pushing forward another 100 metres (110 yd) they sustained increasing casualties after clashing with several groups moving around their western flank to form a cut-off prior to a frontal assault.

Leaving Nui Dat at 17:55, the carriers moved east, crossing a swollen creek before encountering elements of D445 Battalion attempting to outflank D Company and assault it from the rear.

[10] Actual figures are in dispute, by both veterans of the Australian and North Vietnamese side, with allegations of body-count inflation in order to serve public-relations purposes.

[11] A decisive Australian victory, Long Tan proved a major local setback for the Viet Cong, indefinitely forestalling an imminent movement against Nui Dat and establishing the task force's dominance over the province.

Finally, it was possible no ambush was planned at all, and that the Viet Cong had been moving on Nui Dat in regimental strength when they unexpectedly ran into D Company, resulting in an encounter battle.

[15] Brigadier David Jackson—Commander 1 ATF—believed the Viet Cong had been on their way to attack Nui Dat on the night of 18/19 August when D Company intercepted them and this was supported by information from a prisoner captured afterwards.

[16] Yet, from the earliest Jackson had felt the Viet Cong would have to engage 1 ATF in a major battle if they wished to retain control of Phuoc Tuy, and this interpretation fitted his previous thinking.

[17] In dispatching patrols east of Nui Dat following the mortar attack on 16/17 August Jackson seemingly reacted to his opponent's first move, and he may have allowed himself to be shaped into responding as the Viet Cong had intended.

He felt they would have gained more from attacking a soft target such as Ba Ria and that the defences at Nui Dat would have been sufficient to withstand a regimental assault, having been improved significantly in the 11 weeks since its occupation and protected by patrols and overwhelming artillery support, even if they were still to be fully developed.

The southern side of the base was only lightly defended and an assault from that direction would have allowed the Viet Cong to attack the gunline first, and if they succeeded in breaking-in would have then crossed 500 metres (550 yd) of open ground before reaching Headquarters 1 ATF.

Townsend disagreed, arguing the mortar crews and RCL teams had actually tried to hamper the follow-up by breaking into small groups, indicating that no such trap had been planned.

[20] Meanwhile, Major Harry Honnor—Officer Commanding the 161st Battery, Royal New Zealand Artillery attached to 6 RAR in direct support—believed the bombardment had been used by the Viet Cong to register targets and that D Company had stumbled across the force as it was preparing to launch an assault on Nui Dat two days later, with the battle that ensued preventing this from occurring.

[21] A year after, Nguyen Van Nuong (alias Loc), a former Viet Cong soldier who had rallied, claimed to have been second-in-command of a platoon from D445 Battalion at Long Tan.

[22] In accounting for the reason Nui Dat ultimately escaped attack it was surmised that D Company may have entered the killing zone before the ambush was prepared and because of this the third battalion may have been unable to be released.

He argued that the troops in the rubber plantation were not sited for an ambush, while the presence of 2,000 to 3,000 men so close to Nui Dat without prepared positions indicated they were still moving when the first contact occurred.

[23] Equally, D Company had been left in possession of the dominant terrain and was not drawn into a killing zone as the plantation offered too much concealment, no effort had been made to cut them off from any relief force sent from Nui Dat, no artillery or mortars were fired into the engagement area, while the thick vegetation to the north prevented the Viet Cong manoeuvring into a favourable position.

[23] McNeill argues though that too many facts may be missing to make a conclusive assessment of Viet Cong intentions as to date no definitive Vietnamese account is available, while according to Ham those that exist are contradictory or unreliable.

"[8] Yet this was at odds with alleged Viet Cong records to have been captured by US forces of the diary of the 275th Regiment's commander listing that unit's losses as 500 dead.

[33] Indeed, the majority of the dead buried after the battle were wearing green uniforms, and this coupled with their weapons and equipment, indicated they were either main force Viet Cong or North Vietnamese.

They confirmed the dual military and political aim, emphasising the disruption caused by 1 ATF lodging at Nui Dat and the intention to affect Australian public opinion.

Had D Company been attacked from the rear the battle would have been more like an ambush, and they would have been in immediate danger, while it would likely have been irrelevant if the forward Viet Cong troops fired first as the Australians were already well into the plantation.

He stated that a two-phased offensive had been conceived, planning first to draw them into the open and destroy them in an ambush, and then attack the weakened base at Nui Dat.

[42] The Viet Cong were probably still conducting their reconnaissance and establishing the ambush in the vicinity of where the rubber met the jungle when the battle occurred, while the Australians may have upset their plan by moving faster than the ARVN and US troops they had previously fought.

"[44] In July 2006, David Sabben—platoon commander 12 Platoon—and Bob Buick—platoon sergeant 11 Platoon—visited the battlefield for a television story on 60 Minutes, where they met Nguyen Minh Ninh, former vice-commander D445 Battalion.