However, political upheaval had severely reduced the French Navy's ability to fight coherently and supply shortages had devastated its morale, significantly weakening the fleet.

Britain, by contrast, was at a high state of readiness with a well-organised command structure, but was suffering from a severe shortage of trained seamen with which to man its large navy.

Two partial but inconclusive fleet actions on 28 and 29 May followed, during which Howe seized the weather gage from Villaret, granting him freedom to choose the time and place of his next attack.

This final engagement saw Howe use the weather gage to attack Villaret directly while his opponent attempted to fight in a traditional line of battle formation.

In the winter of 1793, war and internal disorder had combined with poor weather to leave France facing starvation following the collapse of the harvest.

To provide effective protection for the vessels involved, a plan was agreed between France and the United States to collect the supplies over a period of months and transport them in a single convoy.

[4] The main French battlefleet of 25 ships under Admiral Villaret de Joyeuse would cruise the Bay of Biscay in order to challenge the British Channel Fleet if it attempted to intercept the supplies.

The convoy's passage was expected to take approximately two months, and it included 117 merchant ships carrying enough food to feed France for a year.

[4] Lord Howe, admiral of the British Channel Fleet, was aware of the convoy's nature and destination long before it left the Chesapeake, and made preparations to block its passage.

[5] April 1794 was a month of fevered activity on both sides of the English Channel as Villaret and Howe made their final preparations for the coming campaign.

[6] Out in the Atlantic, the detached squadrons of Nielly (French) and Montagu (British) were commerce raiding against enemy merchant shipping, but had thus far failed to find the main food convoy.

While Nielly and Montagu searched out at sea, Howe took his fleet on a series of cruises back and forth across the Bay of Biscay in the hope of catching the convoy.

Its escorts, Alliance and Waakzaamheid, fled at the sight of the approaching French fleet, and Villaret was free to attack the convoy, capturing 20 merchantmen.

The next day Howe's ships recaptured ten of the lost Dutch merchantmen, but he was forced to burn them since crewing them with British sailors would weaken his own already understrength fleet.

[a][14] With his enemy visible from the deck of his flagship by 06:30, Howe recalled his frigates and ordered his fleet to press on all sail in the hope of engaging the rear of the scattered French line.

[3] This manoeuvre was apparently conducted on the initiative of Captain Vandangel of Révolutionnaire without orders from Admiral Villaret or his political observer Jean Bon Saint-André.

The ships exchanged fire for twenty minutes, the weaker Bellerophon taking severe damage to her rigging, and falling back to be replaced by HMS Marlborough under Captain George Cranfield Berkeley.

[21] Révolutionnaire had suffered much more severely than Audacious, but survived the encounter without being boarded thanks to a misread signal by Captain Albemarle Bertie of Thunderer, who failed to take possession of the dismasted three-decker when ordered to.

[21] During the night Villaret sent reinforcements to rescue Révolutionnaire, and at dawn on 29 May Parker saw that his large opponent was soon to be supported by the undamaged ship of the line Audacieux, the frigate Bellone, and two corvettes.

At dawn on 29 May the British fleet saw Audacieux retiring to the east but did not follow, concentrating on the main French line with the hope of provoking a decisive engagement.

[25] Captain Molloy then refused to carry out the order, signalling without cause that Caesar was unable to tack and then turning and sailing eastwards down the outside of the British fleet, rather than towards the enemy.

[26] This unexpected move threw the following ships into a state of confusion; Queen, coming behind Caesar, attempted to obey Howe's signal alone but was badly damaged by shot, and her captain John Hutt mortally wounded.

[16] His plan in tatters, Howe responded by example, leading his flagship HMS Queen Charlotte towards the French line which was rapidly slipping ahead of the British, steering around the meandering Caesar as he did so.

[26] As Howe pressed after the main body of the French fleet—now tailed by the damaged Terrible—the rest of his fleet followed, bombarding the already battered Tyrannicide and Indomptable as they passed.

Having driven away the ships threatening Indomptable and Tyrannicide, Villaret reformed his fleet and attempted to escape westwards, closely followed by the British van who were now holding the weather gage.

Significantly, Lord Howe was unaware that to the northeast, over the same sea as the previous day's action had been fought, the ponderous convoy of merchant ships was passing, having successfully evaded British pursuit.

[34] Despite holding the weather gage, Howe's pursuit was soon hampered by descending fog, and unable to see or come to grips with the enemy throughout the whole day, the admiral feared he may have lost his opportunity for battle.

[35] Villaret had made use of the fog to reorganise his force, losing Montagnard and the frigate Seine to the convoy but gaining the independently sailing battleship Trente-un-Mai and Nielly's squadron of Sans Pareil, Trajan, and Téméraire.

His intention was to cut the French line in 25 places, raking the enemy vessels at both bow and stern and dividing their fire so they could be defeated piecemeal.

[41] By 11:30 the initial action was dying down, and Villaret brought his reconstituted force back towards the battle site to contest ownership of the dismasted hulks floating there.