United Nations Multiple MiGs shot down/destroyedUnknown number of AA guns destroyed/damaged The attack on the Sui-ho Dam was the collective name for a series of mass air attacks during the Korean War on thirteen hydroelectric generating facilities by United Nations Command air forces as part of the North Korean bombing campaign on June 23–24 and June 26–27, 1952.

Primarily targeting the hydroelectric complex associated with the Sui-ho Dam in North Korea, the attacks were intended to apply political pressure at the stalled truce negotiations at Panmunjeom.

[1] Heavily defended by Soviet, Chinese and North Korean Air Forces, as well as major anti-aircraft guns, the hydroelectric targets were subjected to attacks totaling 1,514 sorties.

Politically, the attacks failed to sway the truce talks, as highly publicized repercussions in both the UK and the United States Congress undermined their impact.

Four attacks on a much more limited scale occurred between September 12, 1952, and June 7, 1953, causing only minor damage and little impact on the outcome of the truce talks.

The dam's generating facilities provided power for much of western North Korea and for the Port Arthur and Dairen regions of northeast China.

[5] North Korea had six hydroelectric systems and six small thermoelectric plants at the outbreak of the war, and all were on the list of strategically important targets compiled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

B-29 Superfortresses of the United States Air Force had begun bombing industrial targets in North Korea soon after the invasion of the South in the summer of 1950 but had not attacked any part of the power transmission grid.

[6] A ban on bombing the Sui-ho (Sup'ung) Dam was put in place on November 6, 1950, at the direction of the U.S. State Department, to avoid providing a provocation for entry in the war by China.

On April 28, President Harry Truman announced that Ridgway was being replaced as commander in Korea by General Mark Clark, and UN negotiators at Panmunjom made a compromise proposal on the stalemated issues.

The operations plan was finalized when Clark proposed to Weyland that naval aircraft, originally slated only for the eastern complexes, be added to the attack on Sui-ho.

Because the Sui-ho Dam was located less than forty miles (64 km) from the MiG-15 fighter base complex at Antung/Tai Ton Chao/Phen Chen in China, where 150 MiGs had been counted by the weather reconnaissance, a coordinated simultaneous arrival over the targets was crucial to limiting the effectiveness of any defensive reaction.

The carrier aircraft of TF77 crossed the Korean coast at Mayang-do northeast of Hungnam and flew low over the mountains at 5,000 feet (1,500 m) to mask their radar signature.

The propeller and jet divisions rendezvoused approximately 50 miles (80 km) east of Suiho shortly before 16:00 and climbed to the attack altitude of 10,000 feet (3,000 m) for a high-speed run-in.

[21] At 16:00, 35 Navy F9F Panthers began runs to suppress the anti-aircraft fire from 44 heavy caliber gun and 37 automatic weapons emplacements reported around the dam.

At almost the same time, 52 F-51 Mustangs of the 18th Fighter-Bomber Group and the South African 2 Squadron struck Fusen plants 3 and 4, west of Hungnam, while 40 Marine Skyraiders and F4U Corsairs of MAG-12 bombed Choshin No.

The only other battle damage reported by the attacking units was by Carrier Air Group 11 off Philippine Sea: a Corsair hit in an accessory compartment over Kyosen No.

1 and 2 for the night of June 24–25, on the second anniversary of the start of the war, were cancelled after the targets were struck by F-51s during the day, but 25 bombers already prepared for the mission were re-targeted to radar-directed close support sorties along the front lines.

Any effect the attacks had on the communist hierarchy's representatives at the truce talks was immediately negated by reaction of the Labour Party leaders Clement Attlee and Aneurin Bevan who criticized the operation as risking World War III, even though there were no allegations of territorial violations or objections that the plants were non-military targets.

[30][31] The Labour Party saw an opportunity to cripple the ruling Conservatives and called for a vote in the House of Commons to censure the Churchill government, based on the British government's "failure to secure effective consultation" from the U.S. beforehand (The Minister of Defence, Lord Harold Alexander, had been in Korea when Clark first approved the FEAF plan, but had left Korea before the JCS input).

Critics of the Truman administration in Congress quickly seized on the military success of the strikes to question why the attacks had taken almost two years to be approved.

Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett, to whom the inquiries were made, cited seven factors, but some were long obsolete by the time of the attacks and others clearly badly estimated.

[33] Despite the lack of political effect on the truce talks, and the widely publicized negative reactions on both sides, the campaign against the hydroelectric system became an acceptable tactic of UN forces.

[32] Within ten days of the strikes, UN air forces resumed attacks to keep the power grid out of service, although the Sui-ho Dam and its environs were not among the targets.

[n 9] Task Force 77 renewed its strikes on July 3 with attacks by Navy aircraft from the carriers Philippine Sea, Bon Homme Richard, and Boxer.

On July 23, the thermo-electric plant at Wonsan was attacked for the first time, by aircraft from Bon Homme Richard, which reported it completely destroyed.

[34] The United Nations again attacked the Sui-ho hydroelectric complex on the night of September 12–13, 1952, employing a strike force consisting of flak/searchlight suppression flights of B-26 Invaders and naval aircraft of USS Princeton, an electronic counter-measures flight of four specially modified B-29 Superfortresses to jam Soviet AAA radars and communications, and a bombing force of 25 B-29s of the 19th and 307th Bomb Groups using SHORAN navigation aids to locate the target.

[36] After the take off from Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, at 19:00 on September 12, the bomber force suffered its first setback when an unexpected cold front over Korea caused icing in the upper surfaces of wings and fuselage of some B-29s.

[41]Despite initial USAF estimates claiming five hits on the main powerhouse and three on the transformer yards, photo reconnaissance on October 12 reported that the complex was still in limited operation, indicated by the flow of tailrace water from two turbines.

A force of eight F-86F fighter-bombers from the 8th FBG, in "integral flight formation" with twelve of the 51st FIG to disguise its mission, flew as part of the Yalu River patrol, escorted by 66 other F-86s.