[4] A number of other attacks on "humanitarian corridor" refugee convoys and foot columns were also reported later in 1999-2000, including a December 3 incident in which about 40 people were shot to death at a Russian police checkpoint.

In 2008 a suspected mass grave of some 300 persons was uncovered near Grozny, likely containing remains of victims of an artillery attack on a "green corridor" in October 1999.

The applicants, Red Cross workers and other witnesses to the attack unanimously testified about being aware in advance of the "safe passage" or "humanitarian corridor" to Ingushetia for the Grozny residents on 29 October 1999.

Ms Burdynyuk and her husband were aware of the "corridor" and ordered in advance a truck from a transport agency to take them and their household items out (see § 55 above).

The Red Cross workers testified that they planned the evacuation of the offices for 29 October 1999 to benefit from the announced "safe passage", of which they had informed their headquarters in Nalchik and obtained a permit to travel from the local [Chechen] rebel commander (see §§ 46-48 above).

The Government in their submission of 28 March 2003 explained that on 29 October 1999 the roadblock "Kavkaz-1" on the administrative border between Chechnya and Ingushetia had been closed, because it could not cope with the substantial number of refugees wishing to cross (see § 26 above).

The applicants and the Red Cross workers refer to an order from a senior military officer at the roadblock to clear the road and to return to Grozny, which came at round 11 a.m.

As the applicants and other witnesses submit, the order to return caused a traffic jam on the road, filled with cars, buses and trucks.

The pilots in their testimonies presented to the Court submitted that they had attacked two solitary Kamaz trucks on the stretch of road between Shaami-Yurt and Kulary villages, which are about 12 kilometres apart.

The Court finds this difficult to accept, because the Red Cross immediately communicated information about the casualties to the relevant authorities, which had already in November 1999 started some form of investigation of the incident.

The Court finds insurmountable the discrepancy between the two pilots' and the air controller's testimonies that the aircraft directed their missiles at isolated trucks and the victims' numerous submissions about the circumstances of the attack.

The Court does not accept this reasoning, which does not begin to explain the sudden appearance of such a large number of vehicles and persons on the road at the time.

The air force press release, issued soon after the events, spoke of a "column of trucks with fighters and ammunition" and not of two solitary vehicles (see § 32 above).

The question of the exact number of casualties remains open, but there is enough evidence before the Court to suggest that in these circumstances it could be significantly higher than the figures reached by the domestic investigation.

In addition, the fact that the Government failed to invoke the provisions of domestic legislation at any level which would govern the use of force by the army or security forces in situations such as the present one, while not in itself sufficient to decide on a violation of the positive obligation of the State to protect the right to life, in the circumstances of the present case is also directly relevant to the proportionality of the response to the alleged attack (see, mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned McCann judgment, § 156).

To sum up, even assuming that the military were pursuing a legitimate aim in launching 12 S-24 non-guided air-to-ground missiles on 29 October 1999, the Court does not accept that the operation near the village of Shaami-Yurt was planned and executed with the requisite care for the lives of the civilian population.