As a result, provision of reliable information and steps to alleviate commitment problems make war less likely.
[2] Stanford University political scientist James Fearon brought prominence to the bargaining model in the 1990s.
The formal models focused on the causes of war as well as the ends, and defined them as bargaining interactions as well.
Points p-ca and p-cb represent the ultimate division of a good for A and B when the costs of war are calculated into the outcome.
[3] Robert Powell modified the model as presented by Fearon, arguing that three prominent kinds of commitment problems (preventive war, preemptive war, and bargaining failure over rising powers) tended to be caused by large and rapid shifts in the distribution of power.
[2] The fundamental cause for war in Powell's view is that actors cannot under those circumstances credibly commit to abide by any agreement.
[2] Applications of the bargaining model have indicated that third-party mediators can reduce the potential for war (by providing information).
[10] Harrison Wagner argues that the interstate system is one of agreements between states (e.g. to respect each other's sovereignty).
[11] Building on canonical work by James Fearon, there are two prominent signaling mechanisms in the rational choice literature: sinking costs and tying hands.
[22] According to Robert Powell, the bargaining model has limitations in terms of explaining prolonged wars (because actors should quickly learn about the other side's commitment and capabilities).
[23] Stephen Walt argues that while the bargaining model of war (as presented by Fearon) is an "insightful and intelligent" formalization of how a lack of information and commitment problems under anarchy can lead states into conflict, it is ultimately not a "new theoretical claim" but rather another way of expressing ideas that the likes of Robert Art, Robert Jervis and Kenneth Oye have previously presented.
[20] According to Erik Gartzke, the bargaining model is useful for thinking probabilistically about international conflict, but the onset of any specific war is theoretically indeterminate.
Fourth, both the Bush administration and the Saddam regime demonstrated cognitive and decision-making biases (the bargaining model assumes that actors behave rationally).
Goemans also argues that it can be rational for leaders to "gamble for resurrection", which means that leaders become reluctant to settle wars if they believe they will be punished severely in domestic politics (e.g. punished through exile, imprisonment or death) if they do not outright win the war.