Battle of Amman (1970)

Hussein's government considered that the casus belli of the battle was the hijacking of planes carried out by the Popular Front on 6 September.

[6] Within a matter of months, the Jordanian border had become a pivotal base for the guerrillas to launch attacks against the Israeli army.

By 1970, the Palestinian commando forces had expanded to the point where they maintained parallel educational, military, and social institutions in Jordan.

Only weeks before the start of major hostilities, the Palestinian National Council agreed to organize a revolutionary process that would lead to the establishment of "nationalist rule" in Jordan.

[8] The Popular Front gave the Swiss government 72 hours to release three Palestinian commandos serving 12-year sentences for attacking an Israeli airline in Zürich in 1969.

The Nixon administration considered intervening, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) requesting permission to put the USS Independence within 100 neutical miles from the Lebanon/Israel coast.

[18] China expressed its support for the PLO[19] and vehemently denounced the mistreatment of the Palestinians by the Jordanian monarchy and government, suggesting that its military assistance to Fatah had reached its pinnacle.

[6] George Habash, the leader of the Popular Front, believed that the Palestinian militants should have regarded the Hashemite regime as a colonial establishment with aims comparable to those of Israel.

[6] Abu Iyad, a member of Fatah, contended that the Jordanian government effectively manipulated the populace's apprehension towards the fedayeen, categorizing them as "non-believers, infidels, and lawbreakers".

[6] In retrospect, he held the belief "that it was essential for the Palestinian resistance to unequivocally demonstrate that their adversary was not the general population, but rather the ruling family, a few select individuals, and the governing body overseeing the nation".

[6] For prominent Palestinian scholars, the conflict between the PLO and Hussein's government reinforced the perception that the Hashemite regime was "illegitimate, Western-imposed, and a crypto-Zionist construct.

"[23] During the spring of 1971, despite their weakened military situation, the Palestinians escalated their political aspirations by issuing a fresh appeal to topple Hussein's government, while also contemplating the prospect of forming a government-in-exile.