Firstly, in the days leading up to the assault on Ban Me Thuot, II Corps commander Major General Phạm Văn Phú repeatedly ignored intelligence which showed the presence of several PAVN divisions around the district.

[5] At the beginning of 1975, members of the North Vietnamese Political Bureau paid close attention to the military situation in South Vietnam to plan for their next major offensive.

[6] Following extensive discussions on the fighting ability of the ARVN, the Political Bureau approved the General Staff's plan, which had selected the Central Highlands as the main battlefield for the upcoming offensive.

[7] For the element of surprise to be successful, PAVN forces needed to launch strong diversionary attacks on Pleiku and Kon Tum, thereby leaving Ban Me Thuot completely exposed.

Following extensive discussions, PAVN commanders concluded that the ARVN in the Central Highlands could mobilise about 5–7 regiment-sized units to counter the upcoming offensive.

[1] Văn Tiến Dũng believed his tank and artillery units in the Central Highlands were the key factors that guaranteed a quick victory, because South Vietnam simply lacked the capability to withstand such large numbers of heavy weaponry.

[12] On February 18, 1975, Thiệu gathered all his commanders at the Independence Palace to discuss the Ly Thuong Kiet Military Plan, which was approved by the National Security Council in December 1974.

Thus, by the time the North Vietnamese opened fire on Ban Me Thuot, Phú had simply failed to implement an effective plan to save II Corps.

South Vietnamese military intelligence and information received from the American Embassy in Saigon showed the presence of about two or three PAVN divisions positioned about 20 kilometres away from Kontum and Pleiku.

[17] Indeed, the movements around Pleiku and Kontum during the month of February were designed by the North Vietnamese Tay Nguyen Front to fool ARVN commanders in the Central Highlands.

The PAVN 7th Combat Engineer Regiment was tasked with connecting Route 14 at North Vo Dinh with Highway 19 near Mang Yang Pass, which surpassed the district of Kontum.

The PAVN 10th Infantry Division began withdrawing from Duc Lap and only left a small force behind to continue the bombardment of Pleiku, as artillery and tanks units took positions north of Kontum.

The 320A Infantry Division deployed a small unit west of Pleiku to apply additional pressure on ARVN positions at La Son, Thanh An and Don Tam.

[20] As the events in II CTZ were beginning to unfold, intelligence reports from Saigon continued to warn Phú of an imminent PAVN onslaught on Ban Me Thuot.

The 95A Regiment was the first unit to go into action when they destroyed one South Vietnamese Regional Force battalion and successfully secured a 20-kilometre stretch of Highway 19 connecting Ayun with Pleibon and Phu Yen.

While Phú was waiting for the enemy to assault Pleiku, the PAVN 7th and 575th Combat Engineer Regiments cleared the main roads into Ban Me Thuot to ensure tanks and heavy artillery could be directed at the district without hindrance.

[26] By 03:30 the 4th Battalion, 198th Special Forces Regiment, had successfully secured Phan Chu Trinh Road and the southern part of Phụng Dực Airfield and they waited there for the regular infantry and tank units to arrive.

As the sun rose, the PAVN continued to pound South Vietnamese positions around Ban Me Thuot with heavy artillery to cover the next wave of infantry assaults.

In the western outskirts of Ban Me Thuot, eight A-37 Dragonfly bombers from the RVNAF 6th Air Force Division inflicted light casualties on the PAVN 24th Regiment, but failed to stop their momentum.

As he approached the battlefield, Phú radioed the ARVN units at Phụng Dực Airfield to notify them that an operation was underway, and he encouraged the soldiers to hold on to their positions.

In this meeting, Thiệu decided to withdraw what was left of his army from the northern provinces to defend the Mekong Delta region, where most of the nation's population and vital economic resources were located.

[40] After Phú had outlined the military situation in the Central Highlands, he asked Thiệu to bolster the RVNAF 6th Air Force Division with more aircraft and additional brigades to defend Kontum and Pleiku.

General Viên cautioned against moving large military formations down Highway 19; he reminded Thiệu of the Battle of Mang Yang Pass where the French Group Mobile 100 was destroyed in 1954.

Ly was ordered to lead a group of combat engineers to repair the road and bridges on Route 7, as well as maintain contact with the ARVN 2nd Brigade Headquarters in Nha Trang.

The plan was destined to fail, as Phú was unaware that Lieutenant General Ngô Quang Trưởng, commander of I Corps Tactical Zone, had also received similar orders to evacuate.

[42] Although local commanders in II Corps Tactical Zone tried their best to maintain secrecy, the unusual movement of transport aircraft in Pleiku on March 14 stirred up concern and suspicion amongst soldiers and civilians in the area.

[43][44] For PAVN field commanders the withdrawal of South Vietnamese military forces from II Corps Tactical Zone came as a surprise, but it was not totally unexpected.

Indeed, it was not until the evening of March 15, when the ARVN 19th Armoured Cavalry Squadron reached Cheo Reo, that the North Vietnamese began to receive information of Saigon's decision to abandon the Central Highlands.

[45] During the evening of March 17, Tat organised a counter-attack against the PAVN 9th Battalion with support from fighter-bombers, tanks and artillery, but his troops were repeatedly beaten back in their attempt to keep the road open.

The determination of the ARVN officer corps had taken a serious blow when South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Trần Văn Lắm returned from the United States in February 1975, and reported that no additional military or economic aid had been offered.