[4]: 287–309 An assessment in early 1968 found that the division, based in the remote interior, was regarded as a "backwater" and could not seem to attract good officers resulting in poor quality regimental and battalion-level commanders.

[3]: 658–62 On 8 September the division commander, Brigadier General Trương Quang Ân, his wife and an adviser and three U.S. crewmen were killed when their helicopter crashed near Duc Lap Camp.

A new B-52 strike was requested for the base of the penetration while ARVN artillery continued heavy fire to hold PAVN forces in place as the 53rd Regiment withdrew from the impact zone.

[8]: 24 On 26 January, in coordination with the Polei Krong and Trung Nghia attack, the 95B Regiment, 10th Division, seized Highway 14 where it traversed the Chu Pao Pass and held on until 10 February.

Although Quang felt that he could defend Kontum City, ARVN formations in the highlands had lost the mobility that had previously enabled II Corps to deploy forces rapidly by air from small patrols to entire divisions, to meet PAVN threats and somewhat nullify the advantages of initiative and surprise.

[8]: 122 Ground action in January in Kontum and Pleiku was limited to probes, patrols, and attacks by fire, but the RVNAF was busy daily striking the surge of truck convoys rolling south along new PAVN logistical corridors.

Phú responded to the growing threat to Darlac Province by committing the entire 45th Regiment to the Darlac-Phu Bon border area, attempting to find and destroy the elements of the 320th Division.

Phú reacted by sending two battalions of the 4th Ranger Group to join elements of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Brigade, then clearing parts of Route 19 to proceed as far as FSB 95 in Bình Định Province, just east of the Mang Yang Pass, but before the operation could get under way, Base 94 was overrun.

A steady stream of traffic surged south through the Chu Pao Pass as the population of Kontum fled the daily rocketing of their city and the imminent threat of PAVN invasion.

By the night of 10 March the PAVN had a firm hold on the center of Ban Me Thuot, while the principal remaining ARVN infantry, cavalry and RF/PF held positions east, west and south of the city.

[8]: 150 In Pleiku, the 4th Ranger Group gained no ground on Route 19 in heavy fighting near Bridge 23 and Fire Support Base 93 as the PAVN 95B Regiment counterattacked vigorously on 11–12 March.

Regarding the northern part of the country as expendable in order to preserve the security of III and IV Corps, he thought it essential to retake Ban Me Thuot, even though Kontum and Pleiku might have to be sacrificed.

The 21st Ranger Group was assembling the survivors of its two committed battalions near the Phung Duc Airfield and the 45th ARVN Infantry Regiment was moving by helicopters to Phuoc An District on Route 21, east of Ban Me Thuot.

Recognizing the critical situation in the highlands, the JGS decided to send the 7th Ranger Group, its last available reserve, from Saigon to replace the 44th Regiment west of Pleiku, releasing the 44th to join the counterattack in Darlac.

Phú moved his command post to II Corps Rear at Nha Trang and replaced the captured Darlac Province Chief with Colonel Trinh Tieu, his own G-2, whose correct estimate of the PAVN offensive he had rejected.

The 3rd Airborne Brigade, pulled out of Quảng Nam Province on Presidential orders to become a reserve in Saigon, was taken off its ships in Nha Trang and rushed to Khanh Duong to halt the pursuing PAVN 10th Division.

[8]: 152 The evacuation of South Vietnamese forces from the highland provinces began in great secrecy; Phú hoped that surprise would make it possible to reach Tuy Hòa before the PAVN could discover and react to the movement.

Accordingly, only a few staff officers and commanders were told of the plan in advance; the chiefs of the affected Provinces, Kontum, Pleiku and Phu Bon, only found out about it when they saw ARVN units moving.

Not foreseeing the inevitable mass civilian exodus that would accompany the military column as soon as the population discovered what was going on, Phú made no preparations to control the crowds which became entangled in combat formations, impeding their movement and ability to deploy and fight.

Aerial photography taken on the morning of the 19th showed artillery fire still falling in the city and hundreds of vehicles, many of them damaged or destroyed, abandoned along the road and in the streets of Cheo Reo.

On 22 March, elements of the 64th Regiment, 320th Division attacked blocking positions established by the 6th Ranger Group west of Củng Sơn and ARVN engineers completed the bridge over the Ba River.

In a rush to cross, the bridge was overloaded and a section collapsed, but the engineers quickly repaired the span, and many vehicles cleared the north bank of the river that day and night, only to face PAVN blocking positions along Route 436 in My Thanh Tay Village.

The military men were assembled at Khanh Duong, the last district on the high plain before the highway twisted down through the Deo Cao Pass to the coastal hills and lowlands of Khánh Hòa Province.

West of Ninh Hòa, midway between the ocean and the hills of Khanh Duong District, was Dục Mỹ Camp, site of the Ranger Training Center and the ARVN Artillery School.

[8]: 163 Most of the survivors from Darlac were moved on past Khanh Duong by road and helicopter, the Rangers to Dục Mỹ for regrouping, the division soldiers to Cam Ranh and Lam Son.

[8]: 163 In the Deo Cao Pass, with forward positions at Chu Kroa Mountain, a prominent peak over 3,100 feet (940 m), the 3rd Airborne Brigade dug in to await the PAVN 10th Division, whose 28th Infantry Regiment and tanks were already in Khanh Duong.

The mountain provinces of Tuyen Duc and Lam Dong Districts were the responsibility of Major general Lâm Quang Thơ, commandant of the Vietnamese National Military Academy at Dalat.

The most critical mission, the defense of Khanh Koa Province, fell to Brigadier general Tran Van Cam in command the 3d Airborne Brigade, the 40th Regiment and the 34th Ranger Battalion, and territorials.

But before Cam could move from Phu Yen Province, where he was controlling the eastern end of the exodus on Route 7B, the 10th Division attacked the 3rd Airborne in the Deo Cao Pass on 30 March.

The 3rd Airborne Brigade, less than one fourth of its soldiers still in ranks, marched back through Dục Mỹ and Ninh Hòa and stopped in a narrow defile where Highway 1 edged along the beach below Han Son Mountain, just north of Nha Trang.