The 3rd Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment, newly arrived in the country, sustained massive casualties at Hadong in a coordinated ambush on July 27 that opened a pass to the Pusan area.

The 2,000-foot (610 m) mountain ridges of Sobuk-san dominated the area and protected the road from Komam-ni to Haman to Chindong-ni, the only means of north–south communication west of Masan.

When the 5th RCT sent a ROK unit of 100 men under American officers to the higher slope of Sobuk-san, KPA troops already there drove them back.

[14] From P'il-bong, the crest of the ridge line curves northwestward, to rise again 1 mile (1.6 km) away in the bald peak designated Hill 665, which became known as Battle Mountain.

At the same time, from Battle Mountain the KPA could look down into the Haman valley eastward and observe the US 24th Infantry command post, supply road, artillery positions, and approach trails.

[20] On the east side there was no road climbing halfway to the top; from the base of the mountain at the edge of the Haman valley the only way to make the ascent was by foot trail.

A medical aide was also needed to administer care during the trip if the man was critically wounded, and riflemen often accompanied the groups to protect them from KPA snipers along the trail.

[17] The 24th Infantry had not performed well during previous engagements, so Kean sent 432 National Police to the area the next day and placed them in this gap, ensuring the North Koreans would not be able to exploit any holes in the line.

The South Koreans fought as ordered, though the KPA dispatched rearguard soldiers with them to shoot any who attempted to desert, defect, or surrender.

Upon reaching the bottom of the mountain those who had fled reported erroneously that the company commander had been killed and their position surrounded, then overrun by the KPA.

During the day of fighting at Battle Mountain and P'il-bong, the KPA drove off the National Police from the 24th Infantry's left flank on Sobuk-san.

Kean now changed the boundary line between the 5th RCT and the 24th Infantry, giving responsibility for the southern ridges to the 5th, and Battle Mountain and P'il-bong to the 24th.

The KPA considered the Sobuk-san ridges so important that they committed substantial resources to defending them, and attacked the nearby 5th RCT daily.

The US and South Korean troops finally secured precarious possession of Battle Mountain, mainly because the supporting fire of US mortars targeting the KPA avenues of approach on the western slope.

[29] The situation in the Haman area caused Walker to alert the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, a reserve unit, for possible movement to this part of the front.

[30] On August 25 and 26, C Company beat off several more KPA attacks on Battle Mountain coming along the long ridge extending from Tundok.

At one point in these fights, a flight of US Air Force aircraft caught about 100 KPA soldiers in the open and immediately napalmed, bombed, and strafed them.

Airdrops after daylight kept C Company supplied with ammunition, and a curtain of artillery fire, sealing off approaches from the KPA main positions prevented substantial reinforcements from entering the fight.

[21] After daylight on August 30, UN air strikes again came in on Battle Mountain, and US artillery, mortar and tank fire from the valley concentrated on the KPA-held peak.

Artillery, mortar, and tank fire raked the crest and air strikes employing napalm blanketed the top of the peak.

[34] In its defense of that part of Sobuk-san south of Battle Mountain and P'ilbong, the 1st Battalion, 5th RCT, also had nearly continuous action in the last week of the month.

During this time, Master Sergeant Melvin O. Handrich of C Company, 5th RCT posthumously won the Medal of Honor for actions on August 25 and 26.

Although wounded, Handrich returned to his forward position, to continue directing artillery fire, and engaged KPA troops alone until he was killed.

[38] The 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry, never succeeded in gaining complete possession of the southern parts of Sobuk-san, which would have given observation into the valley below and into the KPA rear areas.

The US Navy then entered the battle in this part of the line, its destroyers standing off the south coast gave illumination at night by directing their searchlights against low-hanging clouds on Sobuk-san.

[41] As soon as the heaviest attacks subsided against the 25th Division, Walker ordered it to release the 5th RCT on September 7 to move to other engagements along the Pusan Perimeter.

The 3rd Battalion, 27th Infantry, broke off its counterattacks on Battle Mountain that day, rejoined the regiment, and took its place in the southern end of the line on September 11.

After two weeks of the heaviest fighting of the war they had just barely turned back the KPA Great Naktong Offensive on the main axes of the attack around the approaches to Masan.

He therefore believed that the key to the advance of the 25th Division lay in its center where the KPA held the heights and kept the 24th Infantry Regiment under daily attack.

Woolfolk's force abandoned its effort to drive the KPA from the peaks after its failure on September 18, and the task group was dissolved the next day.