U.S. Eighth Army commander General James Van Fleet had directed U.S. X Corps commander Maj. Gen. Clovis E. Byers to eliminate important KPA observation posts that directed heavy and accurate artillery fire upon Line Kansas position from the ridge, some 2 miles (3.2 km) west and slightly south of Hill 1179.

The North Koreans were protected by thick mine fields and strongly built bunkers that resisted destruction by anything less than accurate direct fire.

Then, as the Eighth Army soldiers labored up the last few yards of the steep slopes, they would move out into their firing positions and send a hail of bullets and grenades at the attackers.

By applying pressure over a broad front, Byers hoped to force the KPA to disperse his firepower and to halt the flow of reinforcements to Bloody Ridge.

[2]: 85–6 The 9th Infantry attacks on Bloody Ridge at the end of August and the opening days of September, on the other hand, failed to dislodge the KPA, whereupon Byers and Brig.

The KPA, weakened by heavy losses, had finally evacuated their positions and left substantial stores of supplies and over 500 dead on the heights.

Taking excellent advantage of the terrain and constructing well-placed defenses, they had fought bitterly to hold on to their observation posts on Bloody Ridge.