At that time, the only major power standing in the way of a German-dominated Europe was the British Empire and the Commonwealth, given the non-aggression pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.

Frustrated, the Germans turned towards the strategic bombing of cities, an offensive which was aimed at damaging British military and civil industries, as well as civilian morale.

[14] RAF Fighter Command defeated the German raids; the Luftwaffe formations were dispersed by a large cloud base and failed to inflict severe damage on the city of London.

The results were positive and the Germans succeeded in forcing the British to abandon the channel convoy route and to redirect shipping to ports in north-eastern Britain.

With this achieved the Luftwaffe began the second phase of its air offensive, attacking RAF airfields and supporting structures on the British mainland.

[23] On the afternoon of 14 September, Hitler and his command held a conference at the Reich Chancellery in Berlin to discuss the future direction of the war.

[27] The policy of attacking London after the successful 7 September raid quickly became counter-productive, and in this matter the Luftwaffe suffered from serious misjudgement resulting from their intelligence service.

Although Mallory and Bader wanted to stop the enemy before it hit RAF airfields, the amount of time it took to position large formations for interception meant that the Big Wing often failed to achieve this.

Prompted by a supporting comment from Leigh-Mallory, to the effect that it did not matter when an interception was made, as long as it accounted for a large number of enemy aircraft, Bader announced that he would rather destroy 50 German bombers after hitting their targets than 10 before.

As long as some sort of cost was imposed before the enemy dropped his bombs and impaired the defence system, the RAF could remain intact to meet the threat again the next day.

If the Germans attempted to use the Thames Estuary as a navigation aid, as so often before, fighters from 12 Group's RAF Duxford could meet them over Hornchurch at 20,000 ft (6,100 m).

The strong head wind slowed the Dorniers, which meant that the Germans took longer than hoped to reach the target, while burning up the Bf 109s' limited fuel supplies.

[67] One German pilot, Feldwebel Robert Zehbe, developed engine trouble and lagged half a mile behind the main bomber stream.

Among the German casualties that day was Rolf Heitsch and his flame-throwing Dornier:[75] the device had not been tested at high altitude and, when used, squirted black oil over Holmes' windshield and attracted the attention of British fighters.

For the sake of the morale of the bomber crews, Zerstörergeschwader 26 (Destroyer Wing 26 or ZG 26) flying the Messerschmitt Bf 110 flew close escort to KG 26.

Possibly to create a reserve, Park ordered 41, 213 and 605 Squadrons to return early though they had only been airborne for 45 minutes and had plenty of fuel left, even if ammunition was short.

[97] Most of the targeted area was three square miles in extent, bounded on the north by the overground railway of the District line, on the west by the River Lea, on the east by the Plaistow Marshes and on the south by the Royal Victoria Dock.

[99] As the Germans retreated back out over the English Channel, some bomber groups scattered while others formed uneven formations and were pursued by RAF fighters.

It lost twelve aircrew killed, eighteen captured and four wounded, including Major Max Gruber, II./KG 53's Gruppenkommandeur (Group Commander).

An eye-witness, air enthusiast Alexander McKee, 22, was drinking tea at a café in Stoneham when the attack began: I went outside on hearing enemy planes.

[114][115] On 16 September, a British flying boat arrived in New York City delivering news of a "record bag" of 185 enemy aircraft.

The Germans were ignored and The New York Times ran several excited stories calling for a military alliance with Britain and her Commonwealth.

Park's handling of the actions was a masterpiece of aggressive defence, yet he was not under the same pressure as he had been during August when air battles were so confusing they were hard to control.

Stephen Bungay postulates that had the loss rates been reversed,[clarification needed] Dowding could have replaced those with reinforcements from his C units and carried on.

[118] Theo Osterkamp pointed to the massed formations used by the British (Big Wing), and put their use down to the ineffectiveness of the 15 September raids.

For him, Operation Sea Lion had also been a huge risk, even with air superiority, and he had been convinced since the end of August the Luftwaffe would not achieve it anyway.

[118] It is likely that Hitler did not want to gamble his new-found military prestige by launching a hazardous venture across the Channel unless the Luftwaffe had crushed all opposition.

[119] At the beginning of December 1940, Hitler told the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) that they could forget Sea Lion, although he did not formally cancel the operation until 3 March 1942.

He discussed the possibility of invading Ireland (Fall Grün, or Operation Green) with Kurt Student in January 1941, in order to surround Britain by land, sea and air.

The lack of RAF night defences in this stage of the war enabled the German bombers to inflict extensive damage without suffering the heavy losses of the daylight campaign.