Possible locations taken into consideration were the Scheldt estuary (where the Walcheren Campaign was aimed in 1809) and the area around Scheveningen (near The Hague) where the planners expected support from partisans of the former stadtholder, William V, Prince of Orange.

[2] It was eventually decided, however, to select the extreme northern part of the North Holland peninsula, because its shore was more easily accessible than other parts of the Dutch coast, which were encumbered with dangerous shoals and sandbanks; because it was only lightly defended, with only a few shore batteries at Den Helder; and because it offered the hope of capturing the northern squadron of the Batavian fleet, a most important strategic objective.

[3] The project of the expedition was of course known to the Batavian and French governments and military commanders, but they were of necessity uncertain of the exact location of the landing.

The second Batavian division, under Lieutenant-General Jean-Baptiste Dumonceau (who was a Belgian, later naturalized to Dutch nationality), was guarding the northern provinces, Friesland and Groningen, and therefore separated from the North-Holland peninsula by the Zuiderzee, which abutted its eastern shore.

[4] As the arrival of the Russian troops that would eventually take part in the expedition was delayed,[5] it was decided to wait no longer, but to embark Abercromby's division of about 12,000 men on 13 August.

He therefore positioned the 5th and 7th Demi-brigades of the Batavian army under Major-General Van Guericke in Den Helder, together with the 2nd Jagers and several squadrons of light cavalry and horse artillery (about 5,000 men in total).

These 2500 men of the 3rd Brigade and Reserve landed without mishap; the first to put foot ashore was Lt. Macdonald of the Grenadier company of the 25th.

The fleet had meanwhile swept the beach clear with a vigorous cannonade that displaced a lot of sand, but did no damage to the defenders as those were positioned behind the first row of dunes.

On top of the dune near this location stood a semaphore station (Dutch: Telegraaf), which, as the nearest "strategic object", was immediately attacked by the British.

Gen. Guericke then decided to intervene on his own initiative and marched south from his command on the Batavian right wing with the 2nd battalion of the 7th Demi-brigade (2/VII) and two squadrons of cavalry and horse artillery, on the way rallying the 2/5th.

[12] He was opposed by the British 3rd Brigade (now under command of Gen. Coote, as Gen. Pulteney had received a wound in the arm and been forced to leave the field).

The British had only enough room to deploy one battalion in line and there was a threat that they would be outflanked near Groote Keeten, where the main action was fought.

[14] While Col. Crass's troops were mauled by the British and slowly being driven back, Daendels piecemeal fed reinforcements into the battle.

Also, a number of inactive Batavian ships of the line were an easy prey for the British, as were the contents of the naval arsenal in Den Helder.

[18] On the night of the battle, Daendels fell back on the nearby Zijpe polder where he occupied a defensive line.

In the next few days he withdrew even further south, as he feared another amphibious landing near Petten in his rear, that would have placed him between two British forces.

The formidable fortress of Kijkduin, that Napoleon Bonaparte had built after 1810, and that was so tenaciously defended against the Dutch by Admiral Carel Hendrik Ver Huell in 1814, did not exist as yet.

Daendels's abandonment of the Zijpe seems more questionable, but only because the British in the event did not perform the obvious landing at Petten, of which they should have been fully capable.