The East India Company's Commissioner for the Punjab, Frederick Currie, sent several forces of locally raised troops to help quell the revolt.

The East India Company responded by announcing their intention to depose the young Maharaja, Duleep Singh, annexe the Punjab and confiscate the lands of any landholders who joined the revolt.

However, both Gough and the Governor General, the 37-year-old Lord Dalhousie, delayed operations until after the end of the monsoon season, allowing Sher Singh to gather reinforcements and establish strong positions.

The next day, he attacked Sher Singh's bridgehead on the left bank of the Chenab at Ramnagar but was repulsed, raising Sikh morale.

Early in January 1849, news came that the British had recaptured the city of Multan (although Mulraj still defended the citadel), but also that the Muslim garrison of Attock had defected to Amir Dost Mohammad Khan of Afghanistan, who was half-heartedly supporting Chattar Singh.

On 13 January, Gough's army was marching towards the reported Sikh position at Rasul, on the left bank of the Jhelum River, about 85 miles (137 km) north-west of Lahore.

Sher Singh's army had originally occupied a position six miles long, too extended for their numbers and vulnerable to a flank attack such as Gough proposed.

[9] It was estimated by Frederick Mackeson, Gough's attached political officer, that Sher Singh's army numbered 23,000 (although most later British historians put it at 30,000 or more), including 5,000 irregular cavalry, with some 60 guns.

However after the First Anglo-Sikh War, the Khalsa was reduced to 12,000 infantry and 60 guns in total, so some historians have stated the Sikh army could not have been more than 10,000 on the day.

[10] On the left under Sher Singh himself were one cavalry regiment, nine infantry battalions, some irregulars and 20 guns, occupying some low hills and ridges.

In the centre under Lal Singh were two cavalry regiments, ten infantry battalions and 17 guns, mostly concealed in or behind belts of scrub and jungle.

On the right was a brigade which formerly had garrisoned Bannu, consisting of one cavalry regiment, four infantry battalions and eleven guns, anchored on two villages.

[9] Gough intended to delay the attack until the following day, but as his army prepared to pitch camp, hitherto concealed Sikh artillery opened fire from positions much closer than had been anticipated.

Gough later wrote that he feared the Sikhs might bombard his encampments overnight, though some of his officers believed he had merely been stung into hasty action.

Hoggan's troops eventually met the left-hand brigade of Gilbert's division, commanded by Brigadier Mountain, behind the Sikhs' centre positions.

[5] An obelisk later erected at Chillianwalla by the British government preserves the names of the European and native officers who fell in the battle.

[19]Two later editorials by the military historian Major A.H. Amin stated: At Chillianwala a British Army which had a high European troop component, a large number of Sepoy (regiments), sufficient artillery, two heavy cavalry brigades to ensure that no one could surprise the British army, excellent logistics, little campaign exhaustion having fought no major battle since assumption of hostilities... failed to defeat the Sikhs...

However, the Sikh soldiers recruited into the East India Company's Bengal Army and Punjab Irregular Force remained loyal to Britain and helped crush the rebellion.

Within the British Army, such was the consternation over the events at Chillianwala that, after the disastrous Charge of the Light Brigade, when Lord Lucan remarked "This is a most serious matter", General Richard Airey replied, "These sort of things will happen in war.