[5]: 254 On the morning of the 13th, after a patrol revealed a significant Chinese presence on Route 24 to the north of the town, Lt. General Edward Almond, commander of X Corps, ordered the 23rd Regiment to withdraw to the Yoju area, 15 miles (24 km) to the south, due to concerns that it would be encircled by Chinese forces.

Ridgway insisted on attempting to hold Chipyong-ni, and directed Almond to attack north to relieve the regiment if it was cut off.

[11] Early in the evening, Freeman gathered his unit commanders and told them to expect an attack during the night.

[3] Between 22:00 and 23:00 hours, the Chinese directed small arms and mortar fire at the Americans from the northwest, north, and southeast.

Air support kept the Chinese away during the daylight hours of the 14th, but the Americans were running dangerously low on ammunition.

[3] About this time, at 15:45, units of the 5th Cavalry Regiment (Task Force Crombez) moved out from a town to the south to support the men at Chipyong-ni.

[12] At 14:00, the Chinese retreated from their position inside the perimeter under pressure from an Air Force napalm bombardment and attack by B Company, in which they lost 50% of their men.

After a bloody fight overnight, on the morning of 15 February, Xu's troops broke through the perimeter and expected to launch another attack when night fell again.

But Xu received an order from Wen Yucheng, commander of the 40th Army, to withdraw as the Chinese discovered that there were over 6,000 UN troops in Chipyong-ni instead of the initial estimate of 1,000 men.

General Ridgway spoke at a joint session of the US Congress on 22 May 1952:[17] I wish I could pay proper tribute to the magnificent conduct of the United Nations troops throughout these operations.

These troops in early February of 1951, sustained two of the severest attacks experienced during the entire Korean campaign.

Twice isolated far in advance of the general battle line, twice completely surrounded in near zero weather, they repelled repeated assaults by day and night by vastly superior numbers of Chinese infantry.

They were finally relieved by a armored column from the United States First Cavalry Division in as daring and dramatic an operation as the war provided.

I want to record here my conviction that these American fighting men and their French comrades in arms measured up in every way to the battle conduct of the finest troops America or France has produced throughout their national existence.The headquarters of the Chinese XIX Army Group, in a critique of the battle which was later captured and translated, described the shock of the armored spearhead which battered its way into Chipyong-Ni:[5]: 251 At 1600 more than 20 enemy tanks coming to reinforce CHIPYONG-NI from the direction of KOKSU-RI, surprised us; by being almost at the door of the Regimental CP [Command Post] before they were discovered, seriously threatening the flanks and rear of the 2d Battalion.and continued[5]: 252–253 In the conduct of the entire campaign, or the battle command, we have underestimated the enemy.

In view of their past characteristics in battle, we expected them to flee at CHIPYONG-NI after the enemy at HOENGSON was annihilated ... We have been taught a lesson at the expense of bloodshed.Now short of supplies, their roadblocks penetrated, and their casualties mounting, the attacking Chinese withdrew to the north.

On 20 February, Sergeant First Class William S. Sitman, a machine gun section leader in M Company,[18] was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for bravery during the battle after he threw himself on a grenade to save five of his comrades.