After 1965, Đắk Tô was also utilized as a forward operations base by the highly classified MACV-SOG, which launched reconnaissance teams from there to gather intelligence on the Ho Chi Minh Trail across the border in Laos.

"[7] Đắk Tô lies on a flat valley floor, surrounded by waves of ridgelines that rise into peaks (some as high as 4,000-foot (1,200 m)) that stretch westward and southwestward towards the tri-border region where South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia meet.

Western Kon Tum Province is covered by double- and triple-canopy rainforests, and the only open areas were filled in by bamboo groves whose stalks sometimes reached 8 inches (200 mm) in diameter.

Prior to the onset of the summer monsoon, Peers set up blocking positions from the 4th Infantry Division's 1st Brigade base camp at Jackson Hole, west of Pleiku, and launched Operation Francis Marion on 17 May.

Immediately after taking command, Peers instituted guidelines for his units in order to prevent them from being isolated and overrun in the rugged terrain, which also did much to negate the U.S. superiority in firepower.

The following day, the elite ARVN 1st Airborne Task Force (the 5th and 8th Battalions) and the 3rd Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division arrived to conduct search and destroy operations north and northeast of Kon Tum.

After establishing Fire Support Base 4 on Hill 664, approximately 11 kilometers southwest of Đắk Tô, the 4/503rd found the PAVN K-101D Battalion of the Doc Lap Regiment on 10 July.

This occurred when its Special Forces commander and a patrol failed to return and the camp received what appeared to be preparatory fire for a full scale ground attack by PAVN.

The importance of the Dak Seang camp was that it lay astride the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the main infiltration route of the PAVN into the South.

By early October, U.S. intelligence reported that the North Vietnamese were withdrawing regiments from the Pleiku area to join those in Kon Tum Province, thereby dramatically increasing the strength of local forces to that of a full division.

The battalion was moved west of Đắk Tô to the Ben Het CIDG Camp to protect the construction of Fire Support Base 12 on 2 November.

The PAVN actions around Đắk Tô were part of an overall strategy devised by the Hanoi leadership, primarily that of General Nguyen Chi Thanh.

The goal of operations in the area, according to a captured document from the B-3 Front Command, was "to annihilate a major U.S. element in order to force the enemy to deploy as many additional troops to the Central Highlands as possible.

As General Peers noted: Nearly every key terrain feature was heavily fortified with elaborate bunker and trench complexes.

By this time, the village and airstrip had become a major logistical base, supporting an entire U.S. division and airborne brigade and six ARVN battalions.

To prevent a repetition of the artillery attack against its base camp, the 3/12th Infantry was ordered to take Hill 1338, which had an excellent overview of Đắk Tô, only six kilometers away.

For two days, the Americans fought their way up the steep slope of the hill and into the most elaborate bunker complex yet discovered, all of the fortifications of which were connected by field telephones.

PAVN troops poured small arms, machine gun, and mortar fire on the Americans and launched several ground attacks.

[2]: 244 While the action on Hill 882 was underway, Company D, 4/503rd was conducting road clearing operations around Ben Het while being accompanied by a CIDG Mike Force.

[2]: 295 U.S. intelligence indicated that the fresh 174th PAVN Regiment had slipped westward past Ben Het and had taken up positions on an 875-meter-high hill just six kilometers from the border.

Instead of a frontal assault with massed troops, the unit would have been better served by advancing small teams to envelop possible PAVN positions and then calling in air and artillery support.

The paratroopers attempted to continue the advance, but the PAVN, well concealed in interconnected bunkers and trenches, opened fire with small arms and grenades.

By the end of November, the PAVN withdrew back into their sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos, failing to wipe out a major American unit, yet forcing the U.S. Army to pay a high price.

[19] Another figure of some significant contention was the claim from the Vietnam News Agency quoted in an Associated Press report that 2,800 U.S. soldiers and 700 ARVN had perished in the fighting.

U.S. Marine Corps General John Chaisson questioned "Is it a victory when you lose 362 friendlies in three weeks and by your own spurious body count you only get 1,200?

It made no difference... that the enemy held all those mountains along the border because they controlled no people, no resources, no real growing areas and suffered a horrible malaria rate.

[12] Operations in and around the Central Highlands including previous battles at Hill 1338 had rendered the 173rd Airborne combat ineffective, and they were ordered to Tuy Hòa to repair and refit.

Several members of Westmoreland's staff began to see an eerie resemblance to the Viet Minh campaign of 1953, when seemingly peripheral actions had led up to the climactic Battle of Dien Bien Phu.

[25] General Giap even laid claim to such a strategy in an announcement in September,[citation needed] but to the Americans it all seemed a bit too contrived.

In the western corner of Quảng Trị Province, an isolated Marine outpost at Khe Sanh, came under siege by PAVN forces that would eventually number three divisions.