As long as the forts could keep the Federal forces from moving on the city, it was safe, but if they fell or were bypassed, there were no fall-back positions to impede the Union advance.

Although the Union threat from upriver was geographically more remote than that from the Gulf of Mexico, a series of losses in Kentucky and Tennessee had forced the Confederate War and Navy Departments in Richmond to strip the region of much of its defenses.

Men and equipment had been withdrawn from the local defenses, so that by mid-April almost nothing remained south of the city except the two forts and an assortment of gunboats of questionable worth.

[2] Without reducing the pressure from the north, (Union) President Abraham Lincoln set in motion a combined Army-Navy operation to attack from the south.

[8] Although land-based forts had long been considered to be invulnerable to attack by naval guns, some weaknesses had been exposed in the Battle of Port Royal, South Carolina, on November 7, 1861.

The contingent of 30,000 to 50,000 troops that McClellan considered the minimum needed for success would be a diversion from other Army operations, particularly the Peninsula Campaign against Richmond, Virginia, that he was directing at that time.

The second was not so easily dismissed; part of Farragut's fleet was a semi-autonomous group of mortar schooners, headed by his foster brother David D. Porter.

Porter was a master of intrigue who had the ear of Assistant Secretary Fox, and Farragut had to let the mortars be tried, despite his strong personal belief that they would prove worthless.

In the next month, Farragut had to gauge the strength of the forts, find the range of their guns, determine the nature of other obstructions in the channel, place the mortar boats where they would be most effective, and put his warships in battle condition.

Reflecting that belief, much of the material intended to protect the city was sent to strongpoints on the Mississippi, such as Island Number 10, Fort Pillow, and Memphis.

Flag Officer George N. Hollins, CSN, in charge of the Confederate naval forces on the Mississippi at the time, personally agreed with Lovell, but his orders did not permit him to act on his beliefs.

The average quality of the soldiers in the garrison was probably not as high as Lovell and Duncan would have liked; the most militant had been drawn off for other fields, leaving the irresolute and the unfit.

[26] Also present were several tugs and unarmored harbor craft, of which two, Belle Algerine and Mosher, must be mentioned for the parts they played in the battle.

Flag Officer Hollins was at this time near Memphis, which represented the then-northernmost holdings of the Confederacy on the river, and the Confederate War Department insisted that no effort should be spared to maintain possession.

Lack of shelter, food, blankets, sleeping quarters, drinkable water, along with the depressing effects of days of heavy, unanswered shelling were hard to bear.

Fort St. Phillips was also surrendered, the CSS Louisiana blown up and even the Confederate fleet on Lake Pontchartrain was destroyed to avoid capture.

[38] The Confederate authorities had long believed that the Navy's ironclad ships, particularly CSS Louisiana, would render the river impregnable against assaults such as they were now experiencing.

On the second day of the bombardment, she was towed (too late, her owners found that her engines were not strong enough to enable her to buck the current) to a position on the left bank, upstream from Fort St. Philip, where she became in effect a floating battery.

[39] After several days of bombardment, the return fire from the forts showed no signs of slackening, so Farragut began to execute his own plan.

Farragut hoped that the combination of darkness and smoke would obscure the aim of the gunners in the forts, and his vessels could pass by relatively unscathed.

Itasca was disabled by a shot in her boilers and drifted out of action; the others (Pinola and Winona) turned back because dawn was breaking and not because of Rebel guns.

Because of their fragmented command structure, the Confederate ships did not coordinate their movements, so the battle degenerated into a jumble of individual ship-on-ship engagements.

[48] CSS McRae engaged several members of the Federal fleet in an uneven contest that saw her captain, Lieutenant Commander Thomas B. Huger, mortally wounded.

Self-destruction, lack of co-operation, cowardice of untrained officers, and the murderous fire of the Federal gunboats reduced the fleet to a demoralized shambles.

"[51] Historian Allan Nevins argues the Confederate defenses were defective: The Union fleet faced only token opposition at Chalmette and thereafter had clear sailing to New Orleans.

The unfinished CSS Mississippi was hastily launched; it was hoped that she could be towed to Memphis, but no towboats could be found, so she was burned by order of her captain.

After a few days spent repairing battle damage his ships had suffered, Farragut sent expeditions north to demand the surrender of other cities on the river.

At Vicksburg, however, the guns of the ships could not reach the Confederate fortifications atop the bluffs, and the small army contingent that was with them could not force the issue.

The fall of New Orleans as a consequence of the battle may also have swayed European powers, primarily Great Britain and France, not to recognize the Confederacy diplomatically.

Confederate agents abroad noted that they were generally received more coolly, if at all, after word of loss of the city reached London and Paris.