After its defeat against George H. Thomas in the subsequent Battle of Nashville, the Army of Tennessee retreated with barely half the men with which it had begun the short offensive, and was effectively destroyed as a fighting force for the remainder of the war.

After a brief period in which he pursued Hood, Sherman decided instead to cut his main army off from these lines and "live off the land" in his famed March to the Sea from Atlanta to Savannah.

By doing so, he would avoid having to defend hundreds of miles of supply lines against constant raids, through which he predicted he would lose "a thousand men monthly and gain no result" against Hood's army.

[7] Rather than trying to chase Sherman in Georgia, Hood decided that he would attempt a major offensive northward, even though his invading force of 39,000 would be outnumbered by the 60,000 Union troops in Tennessee.

[8] Hood even expected to pick up 20,000 recruits from Tennessee and Kentucky in his path of victory and then join up with Robert E. Lee's army in Virginia, a plan that historian James M. McPherson describes as "scripted in never-never land.

Despite suffering losses from MGEN Nathan Bedford Forrest's cavalry along the way, the Federals were able to reach Columbia and erect fortifications just hours before the Confederates arrived on November 24.

From November 24 to 29, Schofield managed to block Hood at this crossing, and the "Battle of Columbia" was a series of mostly bloodless skirmishes and artillery bombardments while both sides re-gathered their armies.

However, because of a series of command failures along with Hood's premature confidence that he had trapped Schofield, the Confederates failed to stop or even inflict much damage to the Union forces during the night.

[14][note 1] Through decisive leadership and good luck, both the Union infantry and supply train managed to pass Spring Hill unscathed by dawn on November 29, and soon occupied the town of Franklin 12 miles (19 km) to the north.

Schofield established his headquarters in the Alpheus Truett House, a half mile north of the Harpeth on the Nashville Pike, although he would spend most of his time during the battle in Fort Granger, built in 1863 as an artillery position northeast of the town.

Lane, and Joseph Conrad (who had replaced Luther Bradley, wounded at Spring Hill) to stop halfway to the Union line and dig in as best they could on the flat ground.

Opdycke considered Wagner's order to be ridiculous and had already been directed by Stanley to retire within the works;[24] he marched his brigade through the Union line and into a reserve position behind the gap through which the Columbia Pike passed.

[31][note 5] His move was very much in keeping with the behavior of Lee and his subordinates in the Army of Northern Virginia in that aggressive action frequently gains one the initiative in combat.

Hood's attacking force, about 19–20,000 men, was arguably understrength for the mission he assigned—traversing two miles (3 km) of open ground with only two batteries of artillery support and then assaulting prepared fortifications.

[2] Hood's attack initially enveloped the 3,000 men in two brigades under Lane and Conrad, which attempted to stand their ground behind inadequate fieldworks and without anchored flanks, but quickly collapsed under the pressure.

[39] The Union's momentary inability to defend the opening in the works caused a weak spot in its line at the Columbia Pike from the Carter House to the cotton gin.

Opdycke quickly repositioned his veterans into line of battle, straddling the road, and they were confronted by masses of fleeing Union soldiers, pursued by Confederates.

Hand-to-hand fighting around the Carter House and the pike was furious and desperate, employing such weapons as bayonets, rifle butts, entrenching tools, axes, and picks.

The brigade of BGEN Winfield S. Featherston began falling back under heavy fire when its division commander, MGEN William W. Loring, confronted them, shouting, "Great God.

He attempted to inspire his men by sitting on his horse in full view of the Federal lines for over a minute and amazingly emerged unharmed, but the brigade made no further progress.

[52] MGEN William B. Bate's division had a long distance to march to reach its assigned objective on the Union right and when he gave the final order to attack it was almost dark.

Chalmers's troopers had actually engaged the Federal right by this time (the brigades of COL Isaac M. Kirby and BGEN Walter C. Whitaker of Kimball's division), fighting dismounted, but Bate was unaware of it because the two forces were separated by rolling ground and orchards.

His two divisions on Stewart's right (BGENs Abraham Buford II and William H. Jackson) engaged some Federal cavalry pickets and pushed them back.

Following the failure of Johnson's assault, Hood decided to end offensive actions for the evening and began to plan for a resumed series of attacks in the morning.

Although he had briefly come close to breaking through in the vicinity of the Columbia Turnpike, Hood was unable to destroy Schofield or prevent his withdrawal to link up with Thomas in Nashville.

""[60] He further cites the timing of the attack, just before twilight, as a key factor combined with the fact that most officers were mounted to preserve their command and control in the fading light, a "result of logical, and terrible, deliberation".

Strongly outnumbered and exposed to the elements, Hood was attacked by Thomas on December 15–16 at the Battle of Nashville,[62] defeated decisively and pursued aggressively, retreating to Mississippi with just under 20,000 men.

"[59] In his Pulitzer Prize-winning book Battle Cry of Freedom, James M. McPherson wrote, "Having proved even to Hood's satisfaction that they could assault breastworks, the Army of Tennessee had shattered itself beyond the possibility of ever doing so again.

Confederate soldiers of Stewart's Corps swept past Carnton toward the left wing of the Union army and the house and outbuildings were converted into the largest field hospital present after the battle.

In 2006, 0.5 acres (0.20 ha) of land bordering the southwestern end of the Carter House property was acquired with help of the American Battlefield Trust and local organizations.