The Guadalcanal operation was under the command of Robert L. Ghormley, reporting to Chester W. Nimitz, while the Japanese defense consisted of the Combined Fleet under Isoroku Yamamoto and the Seventeenth Army under Harukishi Hyakutake.

Along with the battles at Milne Bay and Buna–Gona on New Guinea, the Guadalcanal campaign marked the Allies' transition from defensive operations to offensive ones, and effectively allowed them to seize the strategic initiative in the Pacific theater from the Japanese.

The initial goals of the Japanese leadership were to neutralize the U.S. Navy, seize territories rich in natural resources, and establish strategic military bases with which to defend Japan's empire in the Pacific Ocean and Asia.

[12] The Japanese made two attempts to continue their offensive and extend their outer defensive perimeter in the south and central Pacific to a point at which they could threaten Australia, Hawaii, and the U.S. west coast.

However, the battle did not temper Japan's audacious offensive military posture for several crucial months, with Japanese forces attempting a failed attack on Port Moresby over the Kokoda track.

[27] The island of Espiritu Santo, in the New Hebrides, was selected as the headquarters and primary staging ground for the offensive, codenamed Operation Watchtower, with the commencement date set for 7 August.

[45] As a result of the loss of carrier-based air cover, Turner decided to withdraw his ships from Guadalcanal, even though less than half of the supplies and heavy equipment needed by the troops ashore had been unloaded.

Bereft of his carrier air cover and concerned about Japanese submarine & surface attacks against his degraded fleet, Turner decided to withdraw his badly mauled naval forces from the area on evening of 9 August.

The airfield's rudimentary nature meant that carrier aircraft, designed for rough landings on flight decks at sea, were more suited for use on Henderson Field than ground-based planes.

Jacob Vouza, a Solomon Islands Coastwatcher scout, warned the Americans of the impending attack minutes before Ichiki's assault, which was subsequently defeated with heavy losses to the Japanese.

About 30 survived the battle and joined Ichiki's rear guard of about 100, and these 128 Japanese returned to Taivu Point, notified 17th Army headquarters of their defeat and awaited further reinforcements and orders from Rabaul.

The Japanese light carrier Ryūjō, offered as bait to Allied naval aircraft, was hit by several 1,000-pound (450 kg) bombs and an aerial torpedo; she was abandoned by her crew and sank that night.

[67] Unable to safely land on Enterprise's ruined flight deck, much of her remaining aircraft instead flew to Guadalcanal and reinforced the beleaguered American air units at Henderson Field.

After suffering heavy damage during the battle, including the sinking of one of the transports, the convoy was forced to divert to the Shortland Islands in the northern Solomons in order to transfer the surviving troops to destroyers for later delivery to Guadalcanal.

The Japanese destroyers were usually able to make round trips down "The Slot" (New Georgia Sound) to Guadalcanal and back in a single night throughout the campaign, which minimized their exposure to daytime Allied air attack.

This tactical situation, wherein Japanese naval forces operated freely at night and Allied aircraft enjoyed local air superiority during the day, persisted for the next several months of the campaign.

Hyakutake realized that he could not send sufficient men and materiel to defeat the Allied forces on Guadalcanal while simultaneously supporting the major ongoing Japanese offensive on the Kokoda Track in New Guinea.

During the action three Marine companies were surrounded by Japanese forces near Point Cruz west of the Matanikau, took heavy losses, and only escaped due to assistance from the destroyer USS Monssen and landing craft crewed by U.S. Coast Guard personnel.

The Japanese Navy promised to support the IJA's planned offensive by delivering the necessary troops, equipment, and supplies to the island, and also by stepping up air attacks on Henderson Field and sending warships to bombard the airfield.

At 01:33 on 14 October, IJN battleships Kongō and Haruna, escorted by one light cruiser and nine destroyers, reached Guadalcanal and opened fire on Henderson Field from a distance of 16,000 meters (17,500 yd).

About half of Maruyama's survivors were ordered to retreat back to the upper Matanikau Valley while the 230th Infantry Regiment under Colonel Toshinari Shōji was told to head for Koli Point, east of the Lunga perimeter.

Yamamoto's goal was to draw the bulk of Allied naval strength in the region, specifically the American aircraft carriers, into a decisive sea battle at the same time that Japanese troops on Guadalcanal were attacking the airfield in force.

[131] Meanwhile, on 4 November, two companies from the 2nd Marine Raider Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Evans Carlson landed by boat at Aola Bay, 40 miles (64 km) east of Lunga Point.

Because of Abe's failure to neutralize Henderson Field, Yamamoto ordered Tanaka's troop transport convoy, located near the Shortland Islands, to wait an additional day before heading towards Guadalcanal.

As Mikawa's force retired towards Rabaul, Tanaka's transport convoy, trusting that Henderson Field was destroyed or heavily damaged, began its run down "the Slot" towards Guadalcanal.

Because the Allied attempt to take Buna was considered a more severe threat to Rabaul, Imamura postponed further major reinforcement efforts to Guadalcanal, in order to concentrate on the situation in New Guinea.

[150] The Eighth Fleet's Guadalcanal Reinforcement Unit (the Tokyo Express), commanded by Tanaka, was tasked by Mikawa with making the first of five scheduled runs to Tassafaronga using the drum method on the night of 30 November.

The IGH's top leaders agreed with Sanada's recommendation on 26 December and ordered their staffs to begin drafting plans for a withdrawal from Guadalcanal, establishment of a new defense line in the central Solomons, and shifting priorities and resources to the campaign in New Guinea.

The constant pressure to reinforce Guadalcanal had weakened Japanese efforts in other theaters, contributing to a successful Australian and American counteroffensive in New Guinea which culminated in the capture of the key bases of Buna and Gona in early 1943.

Beyond Kawaguchi, several Japanese political and military leaders, including Naoki Hoshino, Nagano, and Torashirō Kawabe, stated shortly after the war that Guadalcanal was the decisive turning point in the conflict.