Nine days earlier, Fidel Castro had left the La Plata Command, beginning an unstoppable march east with his escort and a small group of combatants.

Castro gathers his officers to organize the siege of Guisa, and orders to place a mine on the Monjarás bridge, over the Cupeinicú river.

In this confrontation, the Batista army suffers 14 dead, 18 wounded and 23 prisoners and 29 rifles, two 30-caliber machine guns, and tank weapons were captured.

On November 21, Castro decided to set up a cave as a hospital in Santa Bárbara and establish his Command Post along with the Cupeyal village, on the San Andrés hill.

[2] On November 23, an] Batista army company tried to force positions along the road from El Corojo to Santa Bárbara, but it was violently rejected and suffered numerous casualties.

Although the Batista army concentrated a significant number of soldiers and means of combat in Guisa, the Rebels gave it a defeat from which it could not recover.

Late in the morning, the Chief of the Zone of Operations dispatches to companies 82 and 52, a section of Sherman M-4 heavy tanks and the battery of 75-millimeter howitzers.

In the early morning hours of November 27, one of the reinforcement's T-17 tanks tried to exit through the Cupeinicú river ravine but was trapped by the slope and the mud.

Castro orders a night attack; at dawn, they retreat to their positions and the army reinforcement arrives, this time preceded by two Sherman M-4 heavy tanks and howitzers.

Although a T-17 tank breaks the position and causes two deaths and one wounded, the rebel fire causes the soldiers to abandon three trucks with more than 20,000 30.06 caliber bullets, radio, and 13 automatic rifles.

The Batista army suffered 160 casualties, some 35,000 bullets were seized, 14 trucks, a T-17 tank in perfect condition, and 300 complete backpacks along with other supplies.

Castro was sure that the military command was not going to recover so soon from the failure, and he ordered his men to rest and, if possible, bury the dead, but to keep alert of the army.

The Bon 25 would try to dislodge the rebels that were occupying the hills of San Antonio and Loma de Piedra, while the 14 battalions would advance in the direction of Los Mameyes, leaving on the banks of the Cupeinicú.

At the height of Monte Oscuro, the vehicles of this troop deviate along the road that leads to Monjarás but is surprised by rebel forces who manage to seriously injure the enemy leader.

Thus, the Special Battalion managed to enter Guisa and covered the escape, along the road to Los Pajales, of the soldiers from the barracks, their families, and people committed to the dictatorship.

The headquarters of the ZO in Bayamo, in secret encryption, explained in detail what happened to evacuate Co. M, surrounded and subjected to strong pressure from the enemy, but minimized the losses in life and weapons.

During the days when Fidel and his troops moved from the La Plata Command to Guisa and during the development of the battle, his talents as a strategist, his political vision, and his personal courage were manifested, leading the rebels to victory.